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Criminal Law
by Frank C. Mills,
I.

I*

INTRODUCTION

This year's legislatively enacted criminal discovery law' will be the
most influential change in criminal law in many years. Only slightly
less significant is the Georgia constitutional enactment of a true lifewithout-parole sentence.2 Both changes will vastly increase the cost of
the criminal justice system to the taxpayer. The latter will probably
increase the cost of crime to the criminal. These legislative events dwarf
any changes by the courts.
Nevertheless, there are many cases of substantial note in the survey
period for this year.' The procedure and proper charge to the jury for
an abandonment trial was changed.4 Apparently one may "escape" from
civil or criminal contempt custody without incurring criminal sanction.5
There appears to be no defense of "abandonment" for a charge of
"criminal attempt" to commit a crime.6 Lawyers should probably avoid
motions to adopt other attorneys' motions 7 and requests to charge by

* Chief Judge of the Cherokee and Forsyth Superior Courts, Blue Ridge Judicial
Circuit. Emory University (B.A., 1970); University of Georgia (J.D., 1973). Member, State
Bar of Georgia. Chairman, Pattern Jury Instruction Committee.
The Author expresses gratitude to his law clerk, Bonnie M. Baer (Tulane University,
BA., 1985; Emory University, J.D., 1988) for her able assistance. I am also deeply
indebted to Marilyn Maxwell without whom this effort would not have been possible.
1. See infra notes 375-88 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 605-11 and accompanying text.
3. For continuity and future reference. The author included in this year's survey all
cases from 263 Ga. 168,429 S.E.2d 921 (June 7, 1993) through 264 Ga. 300, 443 S.E.2d 836
(May 31, 1994) and from 208 Ga. App. 787, 432 S.E.2d 808 (April 15, 1993) through 213
Ga. App. 520, 444 S.E.2d 875 (June 9, 1994).
4. See infra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 156-60 and accompanying notes.
7. See infra notes 257-62 and accompanying text.
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reference only to the Pattern Jury Instructions." Mass arraignments
9 and the court of appeals
are a mess,
abolished the "plea reserving an
10
appeal."
II.

A.

SUBSTANTIVE CRIMES AND RELATED ISSUES

ConstitutionalChallenges

In what may be one of the more significant constitutional challenges
in several years, the supreme court upheld Georgia's Life-Without-Parole
statute.1 In Freeman v. State, 2 a death penalty case on interim
review, 1" both the state and defense challenged the constitutionality of
Georgia's new Life-Without-Parole statute. 4 Freeman was charged
with a murder which occurred before May 1, 1993, the effective date of
the Life-Without-Parol statute.' 5
The Georgia Supreme Court rejected the claim by the defense that the
statute violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it "places discretion to withhold the presentation of a lifewithout-parole sentence in cases of crimes committed before May 1,
1993, in the hands of the prosecutor."' 6 In short, the court held that
"prosecutorial discretion in this situation is no different from prosecutorial discretion in any other ....
[Slince prosecutorial discretion comes
into play under every criminal statute, it is not, of itself, grounds for
striking a given statute down as unconstitutional." 7

8.
9.
10.
11.

See infra notes 561-64 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 356-63 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 623-31 and accompanying text.
O.C.G.A. § 17-10-16 (Supp. 1994) provides:
(a) Notwithsanding any other provision of law, a person who is convicted of an
offense committed after May 1, 1993, for which the death penalty may be imposed
under the laws of this state may be sentenced to death, imprisonment for life
without parole, or life imprisonment as provided in Article 2 of this chapter.
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any person who is convicted of
an offense for which the death penalty may be imposed and who is sentenced to
imprisonment for life without parole shall not be eligible for any form of parole.
12. 264 Ga. 27, 440 S.E.2d 181 (1994).
13. Id. at 27, 440 S.E.2d at 182.
14. Id. at 29, 440 S.E.2d at 183.
15. Id. at 27, 440 S.E.2d at 183.
16. Id. at 29, 440 S.E.2d at 183.
17. Id. 440 S.E.2d at 184.
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More significantly, the court also denied the challenge by the
prosecution that the Life-Without-Parole statute violates Separation of
Powers by impinging on certain Georgia constitutional powers and
duties"8 of the Georgia Pardon and Parole Board." In a cursory
opinion which surprised many," the court made short work of the
argument by merely holding that "the power to create crimes and to
prescribe punishment therefore is legislative."2 1 There is no restriction
on the power of the Pardon and Parole Board because the "statute
providing for a sentence of life without parole, like the passage of
legislation establishing the death penalty ... renders the defendant
ineligible for parole in the first instance. 2 2
This may or may not be the final word on the subject.' Regardless,
the opinion takes on added significance as "due process requires that the
sentencing jury be informed that the defendant is parole ineligible

18.

GA. CONST. art, IV, § 2, para. 2(a) provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this Paragraph, the State Board of Pardons and
Paroles shall be vested with the power of executive clemency, including the powers
to grant reprieves, pardons, and paroles; to commute penalties; to remove
disabilities imposed by law; and to remit any part of a sentence for any offense
against the state after conviction.

Id,
GA. CONST. art. IV, § 7, para. 2 provides: "The powers and duties of members of
constitutional boards and commissions provided for in this article, except the Board of
Pardons and Paroles, shall be as provided by law." Id.
19. 264 Ga. at 29, 440 S.E.2d at 184.
20. The author must eat substantial quantities of crow for the opinion in Frank C.
Mills, III, CriminalLaw, 45 MERCER L. REV. 135, 147 (1993).
21. 264 Ga. at 29, 440 S;E.2d at 184 (quoting Johnson v. State, 169 Ga. 814, 817, 152
S.E. 76, 78 (1929)).
22. Id. However, the language of the statute is no different from that of O.C.G.A. § 1710-7(b) (1990), Georgia's general recidivist statute which provided that "any person who,
after having been convicted... for three felonies... commits a felony within this state...
must, upon conviction for such fourth offense ...

serve the maximum time provided ...

and shall not be eligible for parole until the maximum sentence has been served.'
(emphasis added).
23. The court pretermitted the issue of whether the state had standing to appeal the
matter. 264 Ga. at 29, 440 S.E.2d at 184. Furthermore, the powers to reprieve or
commute remain as distinct possibilities when space and budgets tighten and there is a
threat or reality of federal action. While this may seem speculative, in the not too distant
past it would have been hard to imagine the power to parole being used on a grand scale
to alleviate prison overcrowding.
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where the jury is weighing a decision between death and life
without parole.
The statute prohibiting inducement of a parent or parents to part with
their children2 5 withstood a vagueness challenge under the Due Process
Clauses of State and Federal Constitutions in Douglas v. State." The
term "inducement" is statutorily defined.27 Overall, the language
conveyed a "sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct
... ,24

when measured by common understanding ...

and provide[d] explicit

standards to those who enforce the law in order to prevent arbitrary
enforcement. "28 In this instance, the meaning was "sufficiently precise
for a person of ordinary intelligence to understand that offering an
automobile to a parent in exchange for physical custody or control of a
child is proscribed."'
Georgia's drug forfeiture law, 0 rewritten in 1991,"' specifically
provides that drug forfeiture proceedings are to be held before a judge
3 nevertheless dewithout a jury.12 Appellant, in Swails v. State,"
manded a jury trial in a forfeiture action. He pursued an interlocutory
appeal when the trial court denied his constitutional challenge to the
provisions of the statute mandating a bench trial.' 4 The court held that
Georgia's constitutional provisions regarding the right to a trial by
jury"5 are not as broad as those of the United States Constitution. The

24. Simmons v. South Carolina, 114 S. Ct. 2187, 2189 (1994) (overturning a South
Carolina death sentence wherein the judge declined to charge the jury about the effect of
a life without parole sentence where future dangerousness was an issue).
The Georgia Life Without Parole Statute itself in O.C.G.A. § 17.10-31.1(d) (1994 Supp.)
provides that the "trial judge may instruct the jury: (1) That life without parole means
that the defendant shall be incarcerated for the remainder of his or her natural life and
shall not be eligible for parole."
25. O.C.G.A. § 19-8-24(a) (1991) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person ...
which has not been established as a child-placing agency by the department to... directly
or indirectly hold out inducements to parents to part with their children." Id.
26. 263 Ga. 748, 438 S.E.2d 361 (1994).
27. "As used in this subsection, 'inducements' shall include .... " O.C.G.A. § 19-8-24
(1991).
28. 263 Ga. at 749, 438 S.E.2d at 362.
29. 263 Ga. at 750, 438 S.E.2d at 362.
30. O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49 (1992).
31. 1991 Ga. Laws 886.
32. O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49(o)(5) and (p)(6) in identical language provide: "Ifan answer
is filed a hearing must be held within 60 days after service of the complaint unless
continued for good cause and must be held by the court without a jury." Id.
33. 263 Ga. 276, 431 S.E.2d 101 (1993).
34. Id. at 276, 431 S.E.2d at 102.
35. GA. CoNsr. art I, § 1, para. 11(a) provides:
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Georgia Constitution protects only the right to a trial by jury as it
existed when the first Georgia Constitution was adopted in 1798.36 The
court noted that there were no drug forfeiture proceedings in 1798.
is no state constitutional right to a jury trial for this
Therefore, there
"new remedy. 37 This was a split decision with Justice Hunstein
writing a strong dissent joined by Justices Sears-Collins and Benham.'
B. Offenses Defined
Homicide. Coker u. State' was a case with strange facts. The
defendant was convicted in a bench trial of voluntary manslaughter. He
had been involved in a gunfight over gambling winnings. During the
shootout, a stray bullet from someone other than defendant killed an
innocent unintended victim (that is, someone who personally had done
nothing to provoke the attack).' Thus, defendant was not the trigger
man, and the victim was not the provoker. There was a whole lot of
shooting going on, and a whole lot of imputing going on. (That is, the
intent of the slayer was imputed to the defendant party to the crime,
and the provocation of the intended victim was imputed to the actual
victim with the transfer of defendant's vicarious intent to kill from the
intended victim to the actual victim.) The court held that "[w]here one
shoots at another, intending to kill him, under such circumstances that
the killing, if accomplished, would be voluntary manslaughter, but the
shot misses him and accidentally kills an innocent third person, the

The right to trial by jury shall remain inviolate, except that the court shall
render judgment without the verdict of a jury in all civil cases where no issuable
defense is filed and where a jury is not demanded in writing by either party. In
criminal cases, the defendant shall have a public and speedy trial by an impartial
jury; and the jury shall be the judges of the law and the facts. =A1
Id.
36. 263 Ga. at 278, 431 S.E.2d at 103. "There is no State Constitutional right to a jury
trial with respect to proceedings of statutory origin unknown at the time the Georgia
Constitution was adopted." Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 279, 431 S.E.2d at 104. Justice Hunstein noted that though drug forfeitures
did not exist prior to 1798, the remedy of forfeiture in other contexts did pre-date 1798.
Therefore a jury trial should be required. She also pointed out that the majority of other
jurisdictions addressing this issue found a right to trial by jury exists in similar forfeitures.
39. 209 Ga. App. 142, 433 S.E.2d 637 (1993).
40. Id. at 143, 433 S.E.2d at 638.
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withstood appeal on the general grounds.
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Therefore, the conviction

Crimes Against Persons. There are several offenses in our
criminal code which proscribe various types of unintentional homicides,
or at least homicides where an actual intent to kill is not an essential
element. All are predicated upon some other violation and contain
differing language specifically as it pertains to the relationship between
the violation and the cause of death.' This makes it difficult to

41. Id. (citing Strickland v. State, 9 Ga. App. 552, 71 S.E.2d 919 (1911)). This seems
simple enough, but see Foster v. State, 264 Ga. 369, 444 S.E.2d 296 (1994), a case which
dealt primarily with the issue of merger. In that case the supreme court held it was not
error for the trial judge to refuse to "merge" the felony murder conviction into the
voluntary manslaughter conviction for the same death. Id. at 369, 444 S.E.2d at 296-97.
Apparently trying to limit the holding of Edge v. State, 261 Ga. 865,414 S.E.24 463 (1992),
the court expressed doubt that a charge on voluntary manslaughter was even appropriate
where provocation was by the third party unintended victim. 264 Ga. at 370, 444 S.E.2d
at 297. This is probably not dicta, because it is the underlying basis for the court's
upholding of the felony murder conviction.
If the charge is not authorized, because provocation cannot be supplied by a person other
than the victim, then the conviction in Coker was probably not authorized, and it would be
error to give the charge unless requested by the defense. See Robinson v. State, 109 Ga.
606, 34 S.E. 1017 (1899).
The court concluded in Fosterthat "it appears that the voluntary manslaughter statute,
O.C.G.A. § 16-5-2(a), should be construed so as to authorize a conviction for that form of
homicide only where the defendant can show provocation by the homicide victim."
(emphasis added). Justice Sears-Collins wrote a strong, well-reasoned dissent. 264 Ga.
at 370, 444 S.E.2d at 297. This area is rife with conflicting case law and gray fuizy
opinions and is in bad need of clarification.
At present, it appears to the author that it would not be error to refuse to give the
voluntary manslaughter charge in such cases. It would be error to give the charge on
request by the state. If the defense joins or independently requests the charge it would not
be error. At a bench trial such as that in Coker, where requests to charge are not made,
and therefore waiver would not be an issue, it would appear that a conviction for voluntary
manslaughter under these facts would not be authorized.
42. O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1 defines felony murder as follows: "A person ... commits the
offense of murder when, in the commission of a felony, he causes the death of another
human being irrespective of malice." O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1(c) (1992).
O.C.G.A. § 16-5-3 defines involuntary manslaughter as follows:
(a) A person commits the offense of involuntary manslaughter in the commission
of an unlawful act when he causes the death of another human being without any
intention to do so by the commission of an unlawful act other than a felony .... (b)
A person commits the offense of involuntary manslaughter in the commission of
a lawful act in an unlawful manner when he causes the death of another human
being without any intention to do so, by the commission of a lawful act in an
unlawful manner likely to cause death or great bodily harm.
O.C.G.A. § 16-5-3(a)-(b) (1992).
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ascertain whether case law dealing with the issue of causation in one
violation is applicable to another.
Having said all that, there were a number of cases dealing loosely
with the issue of "cause," or "proximate cause," or maybe even the issue
of "nexus." It was not error in Mote v. State,' a homicide by vehicle
case, for the trial judge to fail to give a requested charge on "proximate
cause."" The judge adequately covered the issue through the language
defining vehicular homicide and also charged the jury that "causation
was a material element.., which the State was required to prove ....
For this reason, and because the requested charge contained some
misleading language, it was not error to fail to give the charge."45 The
court further declined to require the "proximate cause" charge approved
in Johnson v. State' to be given in every vehicular homicide case.47
Judge Beasley, in a special concurrence, would have required such a
charge if a proper request had been made.'
In Lefler v. State,4" a first degree vehicular homicide case, the court
found it was an error for the trial court to fail to charge on the lesser
offense of vehicular homicide in the second degree predicated on a traffic
signal violation and speeding.' In so holding, the court noted that the

O.C.GA. § 40-6-393(a) (Supp. 1993) defines homicide by vehicle in the first degree as
follows: "Any person who, without malice aforethought, causes the death of another person
through the violation of (specified traffic violations) commits the offense of homicide by
vehicle in the first degree .... "
Homicide by vehicle in the second degree is defined similarly, but it is predicated on
different underlying traffic violations. However, it differs further in that it is limited to
those instances "when such violation is the cause ofsaid death....." O.C.GA. § 40-6-393(b)
(Supp. 1993) (emphasis added).
In contrast, homicide by vehicle is defined as follows: "Any person who, after being
declared a habitual violator ... causes the death of another person, without malice
aforethought, by operationof a motor vehicle, commits the offense of homicide by vehicle
in the first degree ... ." O.C.G.A § 40-6-393(c) (Supp. 1993) (emphasis added).
43. 212 Ga. App. 551, 442 S.E.2d 799 (1994).
44. Id. at 553, 442 S.E.2d at 801.
45. Id.
46. 170 Ga. App. 433, 317 S.E.2d 213 (1984). The court defined proximate cause as
follows:
Alain injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or a failure to act whenever
it appears from the evidence in the case that the act or omission played a
substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage and
that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable
consequence of the act or omission.
Id. at 434, 317 S.E.2d at 214.
47. 212 Ga. App. at 553, 442 S.E.2d at 801.
48. Id. at 554, 442 S.E.2d at 802.
49. 210 Ga. App. 609, 436 S.E.2d 777 (1993).
50. Id. at 610-11, 436 S.E.2d at 779.
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evidence did not demand a finding by the jury that defendant's "driving
under the influence and/or reckless driving were the proximate cause of
the victim's death. .. ."" Therefore the first degree vehicular homicide
conviction was reversed. 2
The language of the felony murder statute' that the death be caused
"in the commission of a felony" does not mean that the victim must die
during the commission of the underlying felony. The court in Dunbarv.
State" upheld a felony murder conviction wherein the victim died
eighteen days after, but as a result of, gunshot injuries caused by the
defendant.55
Practicers of "S/M," beware! Consent on the part of the victim, in
Ogletree v.State," made no difference for a conviction of the offense of
battery.57 "It is the act and intent and results of the defendant's act
which constitute the crimes as charged; the attitude of the victim is not
called into issue by these elements."58
Consent can be a defense to kidnapping because it negates the element
of "against one's will."59 However, in Williams v. State," the victim
apparently only consented to go "to find a friend." "The victim did not
knowingly and willingly consent to go... to the remote area of woods
where the co-defendant and appellant attacked and abandoned him."'
Therefore, the kidnapping conviction was upheld.'2
The defendant in Strickland v. State' was convicted of cruelty to
children for depriving his illegitimate child of necessary sustenance."

51. Id. at 610, 436 S.E.2d at 778.
52. Id. at 612, 436 S.E.2d at 780.
53. See supra note 42.
54. 263 Ga. 769, 438 S.E.2d 356 (1994).
55. Id. at 769, 438 S.E.2d at 356.
56. 211 Ga. App. 845, 440 S.E.2d 732 (1994).
57. O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23.1(a) (1992) provides: "A person commits the offense of battery
when he: intentionally causes substantial physical harm or visible bodily harm to
another." Id.
58. 211 Ga. App. at 846, 440 S.E.2d at 733.
59. O.C.G.A. § 16-5-40(a) (1992) provides: "A person commits the offense of kidnapping
when he abducts or steals away any person without lawful authority or warrant and holds
such person against his will." Id.
60. 211 Ga. App. 393, 439 S.E.2d 11 (1993).
61. Id. at 394, 439 S.E.2d at 15.
62. Id. at 399, 439 S.E.2d at 18.
63. 211 Ga. App. 48, 438 S.E.2d 161 (1993).
64. O.C.G.A. § 16-5-70(a) (1992) provides:
A parent, guardian, or other person supervising the welfare of or having
immediate charge or custody of a child under the age of 18 commits the offense
of cruelty to children when he willfully deprives the child of necessary sustenance
to the extent that the child's health or well-being is jeopardized.
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Defendant urged that he had no authority over and no duty toward the
child because the child was illegitimate. He also tried to pass it off on
his wife, who was not the child's mother, by contending she was in
charge of the cooking. The jury was not impressed by such a sexist
defense, nor apparently was Judge Smith. He noted "[ilt is the joint and
several duty of each parent of a child born out of wedlock to provide for
the maintenance, protection, and education of the child... [iut is clear
In this case, the
... that the putative father is also a parent.'
and
custody" of the
charge
had
"immediate
father
also
defendant
child." It was therefore not error for the trial judge to deny a directed
verdict."'
Crimes Against Property. Two remarkably similar cases illustrated the distinction between the definition of a charge of robbery and theft
by taking insofar as it relates to the taking "from the person" element
of robbery.8
In McNearney v. State," defendant snatched the victim's purse from
a grocery cart within three feet of the victim while the victim was
unloading the cart. The victim was unaware of the crime at the time,
but found out after a third party notified her. The victim saw a small
grey car travelling fast leaving the parking lot (presumably containing
defendant).7" The jury was given the option of robbery by snatching or
theft by taking. The astute jurors asked for a clarification on the issue
of the victim's awareness of the crime and timing.7 ' The jurors
convicted defendant of robbery by snatching.72 The court of appeals
reversed.73 The court rejected the state's argument that numerous
cases of robbery had been upheld wherein the victim was unconscious.74

Id.
65. 211 Ga. App. at 49, 438 S.E.2d at 162. O.C.G.A. § 19-7-24 (1991) provides: "It is
the joint and several duty of each parent of a child born out of wedlock to provide for the
maintenance, protection, and education of the child until he reaches the age of majority,
except to the extent that the duty of one parent is otherwise or further defined by court
order." Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. O.C.GA. § 16-8-40(a) (1992) provides: "A person commits the offense of robbery
when, with intent to commit theft, he takes property of another from the person or the
immediate presence of another...." Id.
69. 210 Ga. App. 582, 436 S.E.2d 585 (1993).
70. Id. at 582-83, 436 S.E.2d at 586.
71. Id. at 583, 436 S.E.2d at 586.
72. Id. at 582, 436 S.E.2d at 585.
73. I& at 584, 436 S.E.2d at 587.
74. Id., 436 S.E.2d at 586.

162

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

The court found those cases distinguishable. 5 Finding no evidence
that the victim was aware of the taking before the crime was complete,
the court vacated the robbery conviction and remanded for sentencing for
theft by taking.76
Bryant v. State77 was almost identical factually. Defendant snatched
the victim's purse from her shopping cart while she was looking in the
meat counter of the grocery store. In contrast, however, the victim
turned in time to see defendant lifting her purse. The victim screamed
and chased defendant. Defendant was caught before he got out of the
store. 8 This conviction was upheld because the victim became aware
before the crime was complete.79
If one commits an armed robbery of two tellers at the same bank in
the same incident, one may be convicted of two counts of armed robbery.
This was the holding of McCloskey u. Statese in which the court noted
that "[olne may only rob a person, and not a corporate entity .... Each
employee who was robbed is a victim regardless who owned the
money. s
The court in McCloskey also held that it is not necessary for the victim
to see the weapon used in the armed robbery.8 2 The defendant in
McCloskey told a teller that he had a gun in his pocket and then placed
his hand in his pocket. He also exhibited a note that said the bag or
folder he was carrying had a bomb in it. No weapon was ever seen nor
accurately described, nor was a weapon recovered.' The conviction for
armed robbery was nevertheless upheld. Armed robbery may be

75. Id., 436 S.E.2d at 586-87.

76. Id., 436 S.E.2d at 587.
77. 213 Ga. App. 301, 444 S.E.2d 391 (1994).
78. Id. at 301, 444 S.E.2d at 391.
79. Id. at 302, 444 S.E.2d at 391-92 (quoting Williams v. State, 9 Ga. App. 170, 171, 70
S.E. 890 (1911)).
[I1n order to prove a case of robbery... [by snatching)... it is only necessary to
show that the person robbed was conscious that something was being taken away
from him, and that for any reason he was unable to prevent it; and consequently
the only difference now between robbery of this class and larceny from the person
is that in the latter case the property is abstracted without the knowledge of its
possessor; but if the possessor becomes conscious, even in the taking, that his
property is being taken away from him, and this knowledge is obtained before the
taking is complete, the offense of robbery is committed.
Id.
80. 211 Ga. App. 205, 438 S.E.2d 679 (1993).
81. Id. at 206, 438 S.E.2d at 679.
82. Id. at 207, 438 S.E.2d at 681.
83. Id.
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committed with replicas of weapons or objects having that "appearance.'& The word "appearance" is not limited to visual perception.
"[I1t is immaterial whether such apprehension is created by use of the
sense of vision or by any other sense, provided that the apprehension is
reasonable under the circumstances.* .
In Stevens v. State,' two undercover agents gave defendant $600
with which he was to buy cocaine for the agents. The defendant skipped
out, keeping the money, or at least not returning with the money or the
drugs.8 7 The agents arrested him later for theft by taking for being in
lawful possession of the money but unlawfully appropriating it.' The
court of appeals did not buy defendant's argument that no crime was
committed because the money he received was part of an unenforceable
illegal contract. The conviction was affirmed."
In this country and state, we may not be imprisoned for debt.'
However, it seems annually that judges, prosecutors, and jurors need to
be reminded of this, by the reversal of two or three unwarranted
convictions. This year was no exception. In Myrick v. State,9 1 defendant had accepted $4,000 cash to make certain property improvements.
In
Defendant did not do the work and refused to communicate.'
reversing this theft by conversion 3 case the court of appeals held:
The evidence in this case ... shows the existence of an enforceable
contract, the breach of which would be civilly actionable [but it] does
Even if
not show the existence of a [theft by conversion] ....
appellant failed a duty to make a specified application of the $4,000,

84. O.C.GA. § 16-841 provides: "Aperson commits the offense of armed robbery when,
with intent to commit theft, he takes property of another from the person or the immediate
presence of another by use of an offensive weapon, or any replica, article, or device having
the appearance of such weapon." Id
85. 211 Ga. App. at 208, 438 S.E.2d at 681.
86. 213 Ga. App. 293, 444 S.E.2d 840 (1994).
87. Id. at 293, 444 S.E.2d at 840.
88. O.C.G.A § 16-8-2 (1992) provides: "Aperson commits the offense of theft by taking
when.. .beingin lawful possession thereof, unlawfully appropriates any property of another
with intention of depriving him of the property....
89. 213 Ga. App. at 295, 444 S.E.2d at 842.
90. Constitution of Georgia, Art. I, § 1, para. 23 provides: "There shall be no
imprisonment for debt." Id.
91. 210 Ga. App. 393, 436 S.E.2d 100 (1993).
92. Id. at 394, 436 S.E.2d 101-02.
93. See O.C.GA. § 16-8-5 (1992) which provides: "Aperson commits the offense of theft
of services when by deception and with the intent to avoid payment he knowingly obtains
services, accommodations, entertainment, or the use of personal property which is available
only for compensation.'
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the evidence does not prove ... appellant knowingly converted the
funds to his own use."
In Scarber v. State,95 defendant was convicted of theft by conversion
for failing to account for furniture left on consignment or the proceeds
thereof. Again, defendant played "tar baby," that is he refused to
talk." The court of appeals reversed because there was no evidence of
conversion to the defendant's own use.' Judges Beasley and Andrews
dissented. 8

Robbery, or theft by taking, and theft by receiving are mutually
exclusive." Where mutually exclusive verdicts of guilty are returned,
it is "not sufficient to vacate one conviction and allow the other to
0 1 took the ruling one step further. In
stand. " °°
" Camsler u. State"
order to avoid the results dictated by Thomas, the state argued that
Camsler was distinguishable because the defendant was indicted for
theft by receiving for "receiving and retaining"0 2 the property. The
state contended a conviction for retaining would not be mutually
exclusive with the robbery or theft. The court of appeals avoided that
issue. Though the court conceded that where one is indicted with
receiving and retaining in the conjunctive, only one method of commit-

94. 210 Ga. App. at 394-95, 436 S.E.2d at 101-02.
95. 211 Ga. App. 260, 439 S.E.2d 83 (1993).
96. Id. at 260, 439 S.E.2d at 84.
97. Id. at 261, 439 S.E.2d at 85.
98. Id. at 262, 439 S.E.2d at 85.
99. Thomas v. State, 261 Ga. 854, 856, 413 S.E.2d 196, 198 (1992).
100. Id. It is hard to reconcile this ruling with the abolition of the inconsistent verdict
rule (See Milam v. State, 255 Ga. 560, 562, 341 S.E.2d 216, 218 (1986) and Alexander v.
State, 263 Ga. 474, 435 S.E.2d 187 (1993)) and cases like Cleveland v. State, 212 Ga. App.
361, 441 S.E.2d 820 (1994). In Cleveland the jury convicted the defendant of possession
of a firearm during the commission of a crime (aggravated assault) yet acquitted the
defendant of aggravated assault, the only offense which would have supported such a
ruling. Id. at 361, 441 S.E.2d at 820. Cleveland does not require speculation. The verdicts
cannot be reconciled but the conviction was affirmed because the inconsistent verdict rule
has been abolished. Id. Yet in Camsler, the jury found the defendant guilty of both
offenses. The verdicts can be reconciled using common sense, yet both convictions must
be vacated.
It is also difficult to understand how a reversal based on such speculation could square
with the presumption that "jurors are

...

intelligent men and women . . .. " Hollis v.

State, 215 Ga. App. 35, 39, 450 S.E.2d 247, 251 (1994).
101. 211 Ga. App. 826, 440 S.E.2d 681 (1994).
102. O.C.G.A. § 16-8-7(a) (1992) provides: "A person commits the offense of theft by
receiving stolen property when he receives, disposes of, or retains stolen property which
he knows or should know was stolen unless the property is received, disposed of, or
retained with intent to restore it to the owner. 'Receiving' means acquiring possession or
control or lending on the security of the property." Id.
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ting the offense or the other must be proven,'0 3 the court speculated
that the jury "may well have convicted Camsler of theft by receiving...
on evidence that he received the stolen car."1° This would be mutually exclusive with the robbery conviction. Therefore, both convictions
were reversed.'05
Abandonment. Although the offense itself has remained unchanged,
the procedure for trying an abandonment case received some, clarification. In Whitman v. State,'" defendant was acquitted of abandonment
in a bench trial. The case was tried upon "stipulated evidence" which
the state conceded was insufficient to show paternity or abandonment.0 7 Nevertheless, the court merely adjudicated the defendant not
guilty and declined defendant's request to render a binding judgment
that he was not the father of the child."° The court of appeals
affirmed, holding that in order for the trier of fact to render a judgment
of nonpaternity, it must be convinced by a preponderance of the evidence

103. 211 Ga. App. at 827, 440 S.E.2d at 682 (citing Minter v. State, 170 Ga. App. 801,
802, 318 S.E.2d 226 (1984)).
104. Id.
105. Id. This is important because frequently a prosecutor who has a case based on
recent possession of stolen property will indict for both the theft and theft by receiving.
The usual defense is that the defendant received the property from'some un-identifiable
individual. The prosecutor therefore hedges his bets. From cases such as this it can be
seen that the prosecutor should request a charge that the jury convict of one or the other
but not both, pursuant to Thomas v.State, 261 Ga. at 855-56, 413 S.E.2d at 197. In the
alternative the prosecutor should indict for the theft and theft by receiving by retaining
only.
106. 212 Ga. App. 523, 442 S.E.2d 313 (1994).
107. Id. at 523, 442 S.E.2d at 314. It is difficult to understand why the state would call
or allow to be called for trial a case in which it knew so positively that it could not
establish paternity that it would be willing to stipulate that "the evidence would not be
sufficient to show.., defendant's paternity ....
" The state should have never charged on
such evidence or should have nolle prossed. A procedure such as was used in this case
could totally deprive the child of his or her rights without even having any say in the
matter.
108. O.C.G.A. § 19-10-1(f)(1) provides:
Where the issue of parentage is to be decided by a jury, where the results of those
blood tests and comparisons are not shown to be inconsistent with the results of
other blood tests and comparisons, and where the results of those blood tests and
comparisons indicate that the alleged parent cannot be the natural parent of the
child, the jury shall be instructed that if they believe that the witness presenting
the results testified truthfully as to those results and if they believe that the tests
and comparisons were conducted properly, then it will be their duty to decide that
the alleged parent is not the natural parent.
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that the defendant is not the father of the child.' 9 In short, while a
finding of guilty does establish paternity, the converse does not hold
true. In so holding, the court disapproved the pattern jury instruction
on the subject ° The court suggested that the trier of fact, if it had
a reasonable doubt as to paternity, should render a general verdict of not
guilty.'' Therefore, the trialcourt was affirmed." 2
Traffic and Offenses Against Public Order. If a person is
arrested and confined for civil or criminal contempt, what happens if he
"escapes"? May he be prosecuted for the criminal offense of "escape"?
The court of appeals in Flanagan v. State"' decided this question in
the negative. The escape statute"' is limited by its own terms to cases

109. 212 Ga. App. 524, 442 S.E.2d at 314-15.
110. Id. at 524, 442 S.E.2d at 314, referring to COUNCIL OF SUPERIOR COURT JUDGES
OF GEORGIA, SUGGESTED PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, VOL. II CRIMINAL CASES 148 (1991)

which reads in part:
If you should find that the defendant is not the parent of the child, or if you
have any reasonable doubt as to the defendant being the parent of the child, then,
and in that event, you should acquit the defendant, and the form of your verdict
would be: "We, the jury, find the defendant not guilty by reason of the fact that
he/she is not the parent of the child."
If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is the parent of the
child, but do not believe beyond a reasonable doubt that he/she is guilty of the
crime of abandonment, then the form of your verdict would be: "We, the jury find
the defendant to be the parent of the child, but not guilty of the crime of
abandonment."

Id.
111. 212 Ga. App. at 524, 442 S.E.2d at 314. However the suggestion by the court of
appeals would require, in a jury trial, that the court charge the jury on the issue of burden
of proof and preponderance ofthe evidence in a manner totally antithetical to criminal law
and all the other charges the jury receives. ,This has the danger of confusing the jury in
the guilty-innocence determination on the most fundamental issues of the state's burden
and proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The author suggests bifurcating the trial. The first phase would deal with guiltyinnocence with the usual burden and standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt charges.
In the event of an acquittal, the issue of paternity would be re-submitted. This would
allow the court to re-charge on the different burden and standard of proof. Incidentally,
it might also allow a defendant who previously opted not to testify, to offer evidence in his
own behalf on the issue of paternity. After acquittal, the state could even call the
defendant for cross examination. The state would offer prior felony convictions for
impeachment because of the civil nature of this phase. Many other questions might arise,
however. Does appointed counsel withdraw after the adjudication of not guilty?
112. Id. at 525, 442 S.E.2d at 315.
113. 212 Ga. App. 468, 442 S.E.2d 16 (1994).
114. O.C.G.A. § 16-10-52 provides in part:
(a) A person commits the offense of escape when he:
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in which a person is charged with or convicted of a criminal offense,
whether felony or misdemeanor. The court noted this gap in our law but
left it for the general assembly to correct."'
Last year we learned that one may commit the offense of D.U.I. on a
bicycle." 6 This year, we found out in Bridgers v. State" 7 that one
may commit the offense of D.U.I. in a vehicle being towed, as long as "it
was necessary for the defendant to steer the vehicle to keep it within the
traffic lane." 8
Even though the statute does not mention knowledge or intent, in
order to be found guilty of failure to stop and report an accident," 9
there must be evidence that the defendant knew or should have known
about the accident. 120 The court of appeals in Dworkin v. State'..
found sufficient22evidence of such knowledge in that case and affirmed
the conviction.1

Lesser Included Offenses. There were a number of cases that
dealt with what offenses were or were not included within another. For
example, frequently, for expediency's sake, driving under the influence
defendants are allowed to "plead down" to public drunkeness when there
is a weakness in the state's case. However, if the case goes to trial,
public drunkeness is not an option for the jury or judge on a regularly

(1) Having been convicted of a felony or misdemeanor or of the violation of
a municipal ordinance, intentionally escapes from lawful custody or from any place
of lawful confinement;
(2) Being in lawful custody or lawful confinement prior to conviction,
intentionally escapes from such custody or confinement ....
Id.
115. 212 Ga. App. at 469, 442 S.E.2d at 17.
116. Jones v. State, 206 Ga. App. 604, 426 S.E.2d 179 (1992).
117. 213 Ga. App. 157, 444 S.E.2d 330 (1994).
118. Id. at 158, 444 S.E.2d at 331.
119. O.C.G.A. § 40-6-270(a) provides:
The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or the
death of any person or in damage to a vehicle which is driven or attended by any
person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of the accident or shall
stop as close thereto as possible and forth with return to the scene of the accident
120. Under the authority of Chandler v. State, 204 Ga. App. 816, 820,421 S.E.2d 288,
293 (1992), which required a charge on knowledge in the similarly defined offense of
aggravated assault on a police officer, the pattern jury instruction defining "failure to stop
and render aid" should also be revised to include the requirement of knowledge. See
COUNCIL OF SUPERIOR COURT JUDGES OF GEORGIA, SUGGESTED PATTERN JURY INSTRUC-

TIONS, VOL. II CRIMINAL CASES 143 (1991).

121. 210 Ga. App. 461, 436 S.E.2d 665 (1993).
122. Id, at 463, 436 S.E.2d at 668.
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drawn D.U.I. charge.' 23 In State v. Tweedell,'" the court of appeals
reversed the nonjury judgment of the trial court of guilty of public
drunkeness.'25 The original charge had been driving under the
influence.' 26 The court of appeals held that public drunkeness is not a
lesser included offense of driving under the influence either as a matter
of fact or of law.'27
In three cases the court of appeals held that the offense of sexual
battery"2 is not a lesser included offense of a charge of child molestation. 29 In Duck v. State,'30 defendant was convicted of aggravated
child molestation for the completed act of sodomy with a child. 3' , In
Landrum v. State,"2 defendant was convicted of child molestation and
aggravated child molestation.'33 In Perkins v. State,' defendant
was convicted of child molestation. The reported facts of Perkins are
unclear, but the act of molesting appears to be predicated on the
defendant's acts of peering at a thirteen-year-old child when she entered

123. State v. Tweedell, 209 Ga. App. 13, 13-14, 432 S.E.2d 619, 620 (1993).
124. 209 Ga. App. 13, 432 S.E.2d 619 (1993).
125. Id. at 14, 432 S.E.2d at 620.
126. Id., 432 S.E.2d at 619.
127. Id. at 13, 432 S.E.2d at 620. O.C.G.A. § 16-1-6 (1992) provides two alternative
tests:
An accused may be convicted of a crime included in a crime charged in the
indictment or accusation. A crime is so included when:
(1) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts or a less
culpable mental state than is required to establish the commission of the crime
charged; or
(2) It differs from the crime charged only in the respect that a less serious
injury or risk of injury to the same person, property, or public interest or a lesser
kind of culpability suffices to establish its commission.
Id.
128. O.C.G.A. § 16-6-22.1 (1992) provides:
(a) For the purposes of this Code section, the term "intimate parts" means the
primary genital area, anus, groin, inner thighs, or buttocks of a male or female
and the breasts of a female.
(b) A person commits the offense of sexual battery when he intentionally makes
physical contact with the intimate parts of the body of another person without the
consent of that person.
Id.
129. See infra note 141.
130. 210 Ga. App. 205, 435 S.E.2d 725 (1993).
131. Id. at 205, 435 S.E.2d at 726.
132. 210 Ga. App. 275, 436 S.E.2d 40 (1993).
133. Id. O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(c) (1992) provides: "A person commits the offense of
aggravated child molestation when he commits an offense of child molestation which act
physically injures the child or involves an act of sodomy." Id.
134. 212 Ga. App. 225, 441 S.E.2d 511 (1994).
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a public bathroom and trying to open the stall door." 5 In all three
cases the court of appeals relied on Teasley v. State"' in affirming the
trial courts' refusal to give requested charges for sexual battery as a
All of these cases
lesser included offense of child molestation.'
should be seen, at most, as fact specific. However, the court resorted to
unnecessary language, even going so far as to hold that "there would
never be any reason for the court to charge the jury on sexual battery as
a lesser included offense [of child molestation]. Such a charge would be
error."1 8

Such language is, at best, dicta and at worst very danger-

ous."9 In Teasley the court gave as part of its rationale that "[tihe
crimes of child molestation and sexual battery have different elements
and protect different classifications of victims.""4 It would seem that
the court is overlooking another and possibly more significant distinction
between the two crimes, that of the specific intent in child molestation
to "arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the
[defendant]. " "' If that element is lacking, disputed, or even dependent
upon circumstantial evidence, as intent almost always is, it should

135. Id. at 226, 441 S.E.2d at 513. If these are the only facts, clearly no touching took
place and a battery of any kind would not be supported by the evidence.
136. 207 Ga. App.. 719, 429 S.E.2d 127 (1993). In Teasley the defendant apparently
merely placed his hand on the victim's breast. Id. at 719, 429 S.E.2d at 127.
137. Id. at 719-20, 429 S.E.2d at 128.
138. 212 Ga. App. at 227, 441 S.E.2d at 513 (citing Proper v. State, 208 Ga. App. 471,
431 S.E.2d 133 (1993)). Proper was a case in which the defendant had "fondled [the
victim's) vagina, placed his penis between her legs, and tried to place his penis in her
mouth." Id. at 472, 431 S.E.2d at 134.
139. Judges may rely on such language which is clearly dicta to the detriment of
everyone concerned. Recently the appellate courts have resolved an ongoing problem
caused by the use of unnecessary language in prior opinions. In several cases, appellate
courts had affirmed trial courts who refused to give charges on accident and self-defense
in the same case. In doing so the appellate courts had unnecessarily injected that the
offenses of accident and self-defense were "mutually exclusive." See, e.g., Todd v. State, 149
Ga. App, 574, 254 S.E.2d 894 (1979); Culbreath v. State, 258 Ga. 373, 369 S.E.2d 29(1988);
Boling v. State, 244 Ga. 825, 262 S.E.2d 123 (1979). This led to reversals and a necessary
clarification in Turner v. State, 262 Ga. 359, 418 S.E.2d 52 (1992); Goodwin v. State, 262
Ga. 903, 427 S.E.2d 271 (1993); and Koritta v. State, 263 Ga. 703, 438 S.E.2d 68 (1994),
which now make it clear that the defenses are not mutually exclusive and the court should
analyze each request based on the facts and not based on some "bright line" rule.
Use of the word "never" in appellate opinions appears to be unwise.
140. 207 Ga. App. at 719, 429 S.E.2d at 128.
141. O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(a) provides: "A person commits the offense of child molestation
when he does any immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of or with any child under
the age of 14 years with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child
or the person." Id.
142. Mims v. State, 264 Ga. 271,273,443 S.E.2d 845,847 (1994) (Hunt, J., concurring)
(citing Johnson v. State, 210 Ga. App. 99, 435 S.E.2d 458 (1993)). See also Hathcock v.
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be error not to give a requested charge for the lesser offense of sexual
battery (which requires no such intent), in a trial for child molestation
where an actual touching takes place.'43
Compare these cases with Gordon v. State'" in which the court
likewise held that sexual battery is not as a matter of law a lesser
included offense of statutory rape.'45
C.

Defenses Defined

Entrapment. No matter what means are used, there can be no
entrapment unless the person who induced the defendant to sell
contraband or otherwise violate the law is an agent of the state or
government. 46 In Bowman v. State,147 defendant made a sale of
marijuana to officers after repeated requests of a person named "Chris."
State, 214 Ga. App. 188, 447 S.E.2d 104 (1994) in which the court of appeals reversed a
conviction of a case wherein the defendant admitted the act of exposing himself to a child
but submitted expert testimony that the defendant had no intent to arouse or satisfy
sexual desires. This case, like Perkins, 212 Ga. App. 225, 441 S.E.2d 511 (1994), did not
involve a touching, but is offered by the author only to illustrate that the issue of intent
cannot be taken for granted as the court of appeals seems to do in these cases. Hathcock,
214 Ga. App. at 188, 447 S.E.2d at 105.
143. It would appear that the intent to arouse and satisfy the sexual desires of the
accused was well established in Duck, supra, by the completed act of sodomy, and maybe
in Landrum, supra, by whatever evidence made the child molestation aggravated. In
Parkins, supra, where no touching took place, a charge of any kind of battery could not
given.
However, in the seminal case of Teasley v. State, supra, a charge on sexual battery
should have been given. While fondling a breast would certainly support an inference of
intent to arouse or satisfy sexual desires, such an inference is not demanded as a matter
of law. Another obvious inference might be an intent to insult or scare. To rule otherwise
is tantamount to directing a verdict ofguilty as to that issue on the basis of circumstantial
evidence.
144. 210 Ga. App. 224, 435 S.E.2d 742 (1993).
145. Id. at 227, 435 S.E.2d at 745. See also O.C.G.A. § 16-6-3 (1992) which provides:
"A person commits the offense of statutory rape when he engages in sexual intercourse
with any female under the age of 14 years and not his spouse, provided that no conviction
shall be had for this offense on the unsupported testimony of the female." Id.
146. O.C.G.A. § 16-3-25 provides:
A person is not guilty of a crime if, by entrapment, his conduct is induced or
solicited by a government officer or employee, or agent of either, for the purpose
of obtaining evidence to be used in prosecuting the person for commission of the
crime originated with a government officer or employee, or with an agent of either,
and he, by undue persuasion, incitement, or deceitful means, induced the accused
to commit the act which the accused would not have committed except for the
conduct of such officer.
Id.
147. 210 Ga. App. 831, 437 S.E.2d 840 (1993).
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Defendant claimed entrapment. The officers, however, denied that
"Chris" was a state agent and stated that they did not know him by
name or by sight. They further maintained that they had not paid him
and that he was not an informant. He had merely approached the
officers and asked them what they wanted. "Chris" then conducted the
The court dodged the
officers to the defendant for the transaction.'
issue of sufficiency of the evidence to implicate the informant as a state
agent. The court merely decided that "[wihile [the defendant] may have
presented enough evidence to raise a defense of entrapment, the
did not demand a finding of entrapment as a matter of
evidence
149
law."
However, in Gilbert v. State, 50 the trial court refused to charge on
entrapment. Defendant had finally acceded to numerous requests by a
person known to him as Cathy Cobb to deliver amphetamines to her.
The police used one unidentified female informant who had spoken to
defendant shortly before the arrest. Although there was no direct
evidence that Cathy Cobb was the police informant, there were sufficient
circumstances to allow, but not require, the jury to infer that she was a
state agent for purposes of establishing entrapment. 5 ' Since the
defendant claimed not to be pre-disposed to sell drugs, this was a
sufficient prima facie case to require the judge to charge on the defense
of entrapment. The conviction was reversed. 5 '
In reverse sting operations, undercover police officers pose as drug
dealers in an area known for drug activity and sell [drugs] to purchasers. Following the purchase... the buyer is arrested for possession of
[the drug]. The law enforcement officers use this operation as a means
of attempting to prevent street level drug activities.'5
The defendant in Givens challenged this procedure as "illegal and so
outrageous as to constitute a violation of due process.""54 The court 1of
appeals denied the challenge to "reverse stings" and upheld the conviction. '
148. Id. at 832, 437 S.E.2d at 840.

149. Id. at 832-33, 437 S.E.2d at 841.
150.

212 Ga. App. 308, 441 S.E.2d 785 (1994), cert. granted.

151. Id. at 309, 441 S.E.2d at 787.
152. Id. at 310, 441 S.E.2d at 788.
153. Givens v. State, 211 Ga. App. 290, 291, 439 S.E.2d 22, 24 (1993), rev'd on other
grounds, 264 Ga. 522, 448 S.E.2d 687 (1994).
154. 211 Ga. App. at 292, 439 S.E.2d at 24.
155. Id. at 293, 439 S.E.2d at 25. In response to the defense challenge the court opined
that "t]here was no criminal intent or act on the part of the undercover officers, and it is
the targeted illicit trade of drugs that properly may be described as outrageous, rather
than the reverse sting operations designed and conducted to combat that trade." Id. at
292, 439 S.E.2d at 24.
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156
Abandonment. It is a defense to a charge of criminal attempt
that a person "abandon[s] his effort to commit the crime or in any other
manner prevent[s] its commission under circumstances manifesting a
voluntary and complete renunciation of his criminal purpose.""' In
Givens v. State,' defendants were charged with and convicted of
attempt to possess cocaine. After ordering cocaine from the undercover
officers, they actually took possession of the drugs. However they
handed the drugs back to the agents and proceeded to drive away.15
The court of appeals found that these facts not only did not demand a
finding of abandonment, but it did not even require a charge on the
subject because they had already taken a "substantial step" toward
committing the crime." 0

Accident and Self Defense. The defenses of accident16 and self
The usual scenario
defense" are not always mutually exclusive.'
156. O.C.G.A. § 164-1 (1992) provides: "A person commits the offense of criminal
attempt when, with intent to commit a specific crime, he performs any act which
constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that crime." Id.
157. O.C.G.A. § 164-5(a) (1992):
When a person's conduct would otherwise constitute an attempt to commit a
crime under Code Section 16-4-1, it is an affirmative defense that he abandoned
his effort to commit the crime or in any other manner prevented its commission
under circumstances manifesting a voluntary and complete renunciation of his
criminal purpose.
Id.
158. 211 Ga. App. 290, 439 S.E.2d 22 (1993), reu'd on other grounds, 264 Ga. 522, 448
S.E.2d 687 (1994).
159. 211 Ga. App. at 290, 439 S.E.2d at 24.
160. Id. This seems to imply that once a "substantial step" has been taken, then the
crime of attempt is complete and it is therefore too late to abandon the criminal enterprise.
Such an interpretation would render the section on abandonment meaningless and
unnecessary. If one has not yet taken the "substantial step" there is no need for the
defense of abandonment as no attempt has taken place. On the other hand if one has
taken the "substantial step," the crime of attempt is complete, and therefore it is too late
to abandon. This "catch-22" is noted by Judge McMurray in a strong dissent. Id. at 294,
439 S.E.2d at 26. What makes this entire case difficult to analyze, however, is that it is
difficult to understand why the charge was attempt rather than the completed crime of
possession. As previously noted, the defendants actually took possession of the drugs. Id.
at 291, 439 S.E.2d at 23. Compare Guzman v. State, 206 Ga. App. 170, 171 (199_.
161. O.C.GA. § 16-2-2 (1992) provides: "Aperson shall not be found guilty of any crime
committed by misfortune or accident where it satisfactorily appears there was no criminal
scheme or undertaking, intention, or criminal negligence."
Id.
162. O.C.G.A. § 16-3-21(a) provides:
A person is justified in threatening or using force against another when and to
the extent that he reasonably believes that such threat or force is necessary to
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where both defenses may be present is when a person is armed with a
weapon which he claims accidentally discharged while he was defending
However, in Koritta v. State, 6
himself from another's attack.'
defendant had succeeded in wrestling a gun from the victim. The victim
then rose to re-engage with the defendant. The gun fired accidentally
when defendant flinched from the victim's anticipated blow. 66 "The
defendant unequivocally testified that he 'did not intend to use the gun
to defend [himself).'" 67 Under these facts, the supreme court held that
it was reversible error for the trial judge to refuse to charge on selfdefense along with the charge on accident that was given.' Justice
69
Carley, joined by Justices Sears-Collins and Hunstein, dissented,
pointing out that this is a substantial extension of the ruling of Turner
v. State.17' The dissent suggested that this was not one of the "rare"
cases to which the rule in Turner was intended to apply.'
Agency. While it is true that corporations may be prosecuted for
criminal violations, 172 the existence and involvement of a corporation

defend himself or a third person against such other's imminent use of unlawful
force; however, a person is justified in using force which is intended or likely to
cause death or great bodily harm only if he reasonably believes that such force is
necessary to prevent death or great bodily injury to himself or a third person or
to prevent the commission of a forcible felony.
Id.
163. Turner v. State, 262 Ga. 359, 418 S.E.2d 52 (1992) (correcting and overruling a
long line of cases which, presumably, in dicta had indicated that these defenses were in
fact mutually exclusive).
164. Koritta v. State, 263 Ga. 703,704,438 S.E.2d 68,70 (1994) (citing Turner, supra).
165. 263 Ga. 703, 438 S.E.2d 68 (1994).
166. Id. at 704, 438 S.E.2d at 70.
167. 263 Ga. at 706, 438 S.E.2d at 71 (Carley, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 705, 438 S.E.2d at 70.
169. Id.
170. 262 Ga. 359, 418 S.E.2d 52 (1992).
171. 263 Ga. at 706, 438 S.E.2d at 70. The dissent suggests that under Koritta, I[a]
charge on both defenses must now be given in every case wherein there is some evidence
of an initial defensive struggle over a gun and a subsequent accidental shooting, regardless
of whether the defendant had undisputed control of the gun at the time the shot is fired."
Id. at 707, 438 S.E.2d at 71.
172. O.C.G.A. § 16-2-22(a) (1992) provides:
(a) A corporation may be prosecuted for the act or omission constituting a crime
only if:
(1) The crime is defined by a statute which clearly indicates a legislative
purpose to impose liability on a corporation, and an agent of the corporation
performs the conduct which is an element of the crime while acting within the
scope of his office or employment and in behalf of the corporation; or
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in a criminal enterprise did not shield or provide a defense for the
defendant who was an officer of the corporation in Arnold v. State.7 '
Defendant had defrauded investors. At trial he suggested that there was
a fatal variance between the indictment and the proof because it was his
corporation that was the guilty party and not he. 174 The court affirmed his conviction for theft by deception, holding that "'lain officer or
an agent of a corporation cannot shield himself from criminal responsibility for his own acts on the ground that they were done in his official
capacity as an officer or agent of such corporation.' 1 5
Insanity. In Johnson v. State,7 ' defendant had not filed a plea of
incompetence prior to the start of trial.1 77 At the call of the case,
counsel for defendant notified the court of defendant's bizarre conduct
and the fact that defendant had recently been admitted to a mental
health facility. The court inquired into the matter, found that defendant
was faking, and proceeded to trial.17" After conviction, defendant
contended in a motion for new trial and on appeal that he was denied an
adequate hearing on the issue of competency." 9 The court of appeals
noted that even when the issue has not been raised by the defense, the
court has an "inherent duty""s to inquire into the issue of competency,
"sua sponte... when the information known to the court at the time of
the trial ... is sufficient to raise a bona fide doubt regarding the

defendant's competence."' 8"

The duty exists "even where the doubt

(2) The commission of the crime is authorized, requested, commanded,
performed, or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a managerial
official who is acting within the scope of his employment in behalf of the

corporation.
Id.
173. 210 Ga. App. 843, 437 S.E.2d 844 (1993).
174. Id. at 846, 437 S.E.2d at 847.
175. Id. (citing Thompson v. State, 85 Ga. App. 298, 69 S.E.2d 206 (1952)).
176. 209 Ga. App. 514, 433 S.E.2d 717 (1993).
177. Id. at 515, 433 S.E.2d at 718, See also O.C.G.A. § 17-7-130(a) (1992) which
provides:

Whenever a plea is filed that a defendant in a criminal case is mentally
incompetent to stand trial, it shall be the duty of the court to cause the issue of
the defendant's mental competency to stand trial to be tried first by a special jury.
If the special jury finds the defendant mentally incompetent to stand trial, the
court shall retain jurisdiction over the defendant but shall transfer the defendant
to the Department of Human Resources.
Id.
178. 209 Ga. App. at 515, 433 S.E.2d at 718.

179. Id. at 515, 443 S.E.2d at 719.
180. Id., 443 S.E.2d at 719 (citing Baker v. State, 250 Ga. 187, 297 S.E.2d 9 (1982)).
181. Id. at 515-16, 443 S.E.2d 719 (citing Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966)).

1994]

CRIMINAL LAW

regarding a defendant's competency arises during the course of a
trial."182 The court further identified three factors to consider in
determining whether the trial court should have conducted an inquiry
into the issue of competence: "1. evidence of the defendant's irrational
behavior; 2. the defendant's demeanor at trial; and 3. prior medical
opinion regarding the defendant's competence to stand trial."1s8
Finally, however, the court held that where no special pretrial plea of
insanity has been filed "the trial court ha[s] no mandatory duty to
Therefore, in
impanel a special jury to determine that issue."1'
Johnson the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to
conduct a special trial on the issue. The informal inquiry was sufficient
absent more compelling evidence of incompetence.'
In a sequel to an opinion from last year,"' the supreme court in
Nagel v. State1 87 affirmed the trial court's denial of Nagel's application
for release after having been found not guilty by reason of insanity."s
The case had been remanded for rehearing after previous clarification of
evidentiary issues by the supreme court.'8 9 The remanding court had
previously held that the presumption of continuing insanity alone would
It also
be insufficient to withstand undisputed medical evidence. 1
established a new appellate standard of review on the issue: "whether
after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, a
rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant failed to prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that he was [sane] .
The interesting thing about the sequel was the "Catch-22" result.'

182. Id. at 516, 443 S.E.2d at 719 (citing Bowden v. Francis, 733 F.2d 740 (11th Cir.
1984)).
183. Id. (citing Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975)).
184. Id, (citing Dowdy v. State, 169 Ga. App. 14, 311 S.E.2d 184 (1983)).
185. Id.
186. Nagel v. State, 262 Ga. 888, 427 S.E.2d 490 (1993). See also Frank C. Mills, III,
CriminalLaw and Procedure, 45 MERCER L. REV. 135, 163 (1993).
187. Nagel v. State, 264 Ga. 150, 442 S.E.2d 446 (1994).
188. 1d. at 151, 442 S.E.2d at 448. See also O.C.G.A. § 17-7-131(f) (Supp. 1994) which
provides:
A defendant who has been found not guilty by reason of insanity at the time of the
crime and is ordered committed to the Department of Human Resources under
subsection (e) of this Code section may only be discharged from that commitment
by order of the committing court in accordance with the procedures specified in
this subsection.
Id.
189. 262 Ga. at 891-93, 427 S.E.2d at 492-93.
190. Id. at 889, 427 S.E.2d at 491.
191. Id. at 892, 427 S.E.2d at 493.
192. 264 Ga. at 155, 442 S.E.2d at 451 (Sears-Collins, J., dissenting). She states:
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The defense experts at the release hearing expressed the opinion that
defendant was not now nor had he ever been insane and that the jury
verdict acquitting him by reason of insanity had been a mistake.
Therefore defendant did not meet the criteria for civil commitment. 93
The joke was on the defendant, however, as the supreme court concluded
that "the opinions of appellants experts that he had never really been
insane were obviously entitled to no weight whatsoever, since the jury's
verdict was res judicata as to appellant's insanity at the time of the
murders."'
Therefore there was no evidence defendant's sanity had
been restored. 95 Being careful not to base its opinion entirely on that
premise, the supreme court pointed out other evidence of defendant's
history in the record and a lack of certainty on the part of some of
defendant's experts. The supreme court, therefore, affirmed.'"
In an incisive, meticulously crafted dissent, Justice Sears-Collins
roundly chastised the majority for being swayed by fears and passions
into overlooking their duty in this unusually brutal case.' 97

III.
A.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Pretrial
Search and Seizure

the majority's analysis would confine Nagel for life, no matter how overwhelming
the evidence that he is not now mentally ill. The only way for Nagel to overcome
this particular burden would be to convince a psychiatrist to testify falsely that

he or she is of the opinion that Nagel was mentally ill at that time and that the
jury reached the correct result. Such a Catch-22 could not possibly have been the

intent of our release statutes.
Id.
193. 264 Ga. at 151, 442 S.E.2d at 448.
194. Id. (emphasis in original).

195. Id. at 152, 442 S.E.2d at 448.
196. Id. at 153, 442 S.E.2d at 449.
197.

264 Ga. at 153, 442 S.E.2d at 449 (Sears-Collins, J., dissenting).

This court has seen few other cases that are as repulsive and brutal as this one.
Because of the circumstances of his crimes, Nagel's request for release has caused

much anxiety and apprehension. Nevertheless, this court is required by law not
to act on such passions, but rather to apply the laws of this state to this delicate
situation.
Id. She then seemingly reminds the majority of the motto over their bench "Fiat justitia,
ruat caelum." (Let justice be done, though the sky should fall.) Her dissent seems

irrefutable and may ultimately carry the day. The majority opinion may be a good example
of the old maxim "bad facts make bad law."
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Terry Stops. As usual, this year's crop of cases includes many in
which the ultimate issue of the validity of a search or admissibility of a
statement turns on the legality of the initial encounter with the police.
"Theoretically, there are at least three kinds of police-citizen encounters:
verbal encounters involving no coercion or detention [which do not
invoke the Fourth Amendment]; brief 'stops' or 'seizures' which must be
accompanied by a reasonable suspicion; and 'arrests' which must be
supported by probable cause.""9 8 Terry, 19 9 or investigative, stops fall
into the second category
In Goodman v. State," the police received information from a
woman who described drug selling activity of two black males at a given
intersection. The police proceeded to that location and began an inquiry
of a black male in a parked automobile. The police checked his driver's
license and moved him to the patrol car while completing the license
check. Meanwhile defendant's cohort returned, a chase ensued, and
eventually cocaine was found. 1
The defendant challenged the initial stop as pretextual. There had
been no showing of reliability of the informant. 2 The court held that
"the fact that the informant was not shown to be reliable is not relevant
to our inquiry An inquiry into the indicia of reliability of the informant
is appropriate when determining the presence or absence of probable
cause, but is inapplicable to evaluating information prompting a mere
investigatory stop."' 3 The officer's suspicion was reasonable and
corroborated by the basic facts found on the scene. The court, therefore,
204
affirmed.
Burdette v. State 5 was a similar challenge involving slightly
different facts. The informant in Burdette had been caught with drugs.
The police drove to the informant's apartment to conduct a consent
search. The informant pointed out defendant Burdette, seated in an
automobile at Burdette's apartment complex, as his supplier. Burdette
attempted to leave and was stopped. He had committed no traffic
violation or any other offense. Nor had the informant, even if reliable,
given any indication that defendant would presently have drugs in his

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Jamison v. State, 199 Ga. App. 401, 404, 405 S.E.2d 82, 84 (1991) cert. granted.
So named after Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
210 Ga. App. 369, 436 S.E.2d 85 (1993).
Id. at 369-70, 436 S.E.2d at 86.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 370, 436 S.E.2d at 87.
210 Ga. App. 471, 436 S.E.2d 502 (1993).
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possession or be engaged in any criminal activity.'
In affirming, the
court re-iterated that a showing of reliability of the informant was not
required in this kind of stop.2° ' The court held, "The inquiry must
focus on whether unconfirmed information regarding past activity can
give rise to an articulable suspicion of present or future criminal activity
sufficient to justify an investigative stop."2° The court held that the
information in this case was sufficient "[to] remove the police's actions
beyond the realm of either the 'unparticularized suspicion or hunch'
standard ... or 'mere caprice or arbitrary harassment."'2 ° The court
found the officers could have reasonably inferred present or future drug
activity and therefore affirmed. 1 0
Compare Postell v. State21 1 in which the supreme court reversed the
court of appeals212 based on an illegal investigative stop. In Postell the
officers had similar information about a planned drug transaction at a
specific address. They also had a list of names of couriers. Defendant's
name was not on the list. As defendant approached the address, the
surveilling officers made an investigative stop. As a result of the stop
the officers found illegal drugs.213 The supreme court reversed because
the information was not sufficiently particularized as to that defendant,
and "Postell's presence 100 yards from the staked-out target [did] not
link him to the purported delivery of contraband." 214
Standing alone, the fact that a person is of the same race (and sex) as
a suspect is insufficient to authorize a Terry stop. In Wheeler v.
State,1 6 the officer who stopped a suspected burglar admitted that he
did so solely because the defendant was a black man, as was the
described perpetrator. The police had no other description of the
suspect.216 The court reversed, finding such information not sufficiently "particularized.""'
"Investigative stops of vehicles are analogous to Terry Stops .... .211
Frequently, automobile investigative stops are made for minor traffic

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id. at 472, 436 S.E.2d at 503.
Id.
Id. at 473, 463 S.E.2d at 504.
Id. (citing State v. Watson, 205 Ga. App. 313, 422 S.E.2d 202 (1992)).
Id.
264 Ga. 249, 443 S.E.2d 628 (1994).
See Postell v. State, 209 Ga. App. 462, 433 S.E.2d 588 (1993).
264 Ga. at 250, 443 S.E.2d at 629.
Id. at 251, 443 S.E.2d at 629.
Wheeler v. State, 210 Ga. App. 653, 437 S.E.2d 823 (1993).
Id.
Id. at 653, 437 S.E.2d at 824.
Burdette v. State, 210 Ga. App. 471, 472, 436 S.E.2d 502, 504 (1993).
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violations, after which plain view or consent result in a finding of
contraband. One such frequently used traffic violation is failure to use
a turn signal.219 However, in Clark v. State," the use of that violation as a pretext for making a stop was somewhat curtailed. When the
defendant in Clark changed lanes to exit, no other vehicle was within
300 feet of his vehicle.2 1 In reversing, the court found the stop to be
illegal because "the legislature anticipated occasions when a signal was
not required. 2 The court construed the "turn signal" statute to mean
that a turn signal was required only "when required" to enable a lane
change or turn to be made with "reasonable safety." As defendant's
lane change endangered no one, there was no violation, and no valid
reason to stop. Therefore the alleged turn signal violation was merely
a pretext. The evidence found as a result of the illegal stop should have
been suppressed.'
Consent Searches. "Once a voluntary consent [to search] is legally
obtained, it continues until it either is revoked or withdrawn. "
However, in Kendrick v. State,'

the court of appeals held that once

a valid consent had been given by defendant's wife, only she could
revoke it."7 It was undisputed that defendant's wife had common
authority over defendant's house as she had invited the officers in.
Defendant asked the officers to leave. However, there was no evidence
that defendant's wife joined in the request that they leave nor in any

219. See O.C.GA. § 40-6-123(a) & (b) (1991) which provides:
(a) No person shall turn a vehicle at an intersection- unless the vehicle is in
proper position upon the roadway as required in Code Section 40-6-120 or turn a
vehicle to enter a private road or driveway or otherwise turn a vehicle from a

direct course or change lanes or move right or left upon a roadway unless and
until such movement can be made with reasonable safety. No person shall so turn
any vehicle without giving an appropriate and timely signal in the manner
provided in this Code section.
(b) A signal of intention to turn right or left or change lanes when required shall
be given continuously for a time sufficient to alert the driver of a vehicle
proceeding from the rear in the same direction or a driver of a vehicle approaching
from the opposite direction.

Id.
220. 208 Ga. App. 896, 432 S.E.2d 220 (1993).

221. Id. at 897, 432 S.E.2d at 221.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 899, 432 S.E.2d at 222.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Id., 432 S.E.2d at 223.
Calixte v. State, 197 Ga. App. 723, 726, 399 S.E.2d 490, 493 (1990).
211 Ga. App. 599, 440 S.E.2d 53 (1993).
Id. at 601, 440 S.E.2d at 55.
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other way revoked her prior consent."5 As she was the only one who
could revoke the consent she had given, the officers' continued presence
and the defendant's arrest were lawfiul. 2
PlainView. In a case which contains a good discussion of the present
state of the law on "plain view," the court of appeals upheld a seizure by
an officer who had walked around to the back of the house to see if
anyone was home and saw marijuana." 0 The court in Gilbreath u.
State 1 held that this did not make the officer a trespasser where, the
2
officer "merely tak[es] the same route as would any guest or caller."1
Nor would the result be any different if the officer "suspected that he
might find incriminating evidence when he walked around to check the
back door."'
The court identified modified criteria 2 34 "which ...
must exist before plain view is applicable to authorize a warrantless
seizure of evidence."2 5 They are:
1. That there must be a prior valid intrusion onto a person's property
before evidence is observed or seized; 2. Discovery of the evidence
must be the result of its being in plain view and not the result of an
investigatory search; and 3. It must be immediately apparent that the
item seized is evidence or contraband.2
Search Warrants. The court of appeals held in State v. Kirkland 7
that a magistrate cannot issue a search warrant for a locality outside his
jurisdiction, and this is not just a meaningless technical defect."3 The
warrant issued by an Atlanta City Court judge for defendant's home in
Coweta County was a nullity.'s

228.
229.

Id.
Id.

230. Gilbreath v. State, 213 Ga. App. 80, 82, 443 S.E.2d 664, 666 (1994).
231. 213 Ga. App. 80, 443 S.E.2d 664 (1994).
232. Id. at 83, 443 S.E.2d at 667.
233. Id. (inadvertence requirement has been abolished).
234. Id. 443 S.E.2d at 666 (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990)).
235. Id. at 82, 443 S.E.2d at 666 (noting that "'plain view' is best understood not as an
independent exception to the Warrant Clause but simply as an extension of whatever prior
justification might exist for an officer's access to an object or situation." Id. (quoting State
v. Echols, 204 Ga. App. 630, 631, 420 S.E.2d 64, 65 (1992))).
236. Id. at 83, 443 S.E.2d at 666.
237. 212 Ga. App. 672, 442 S.E.2d 491 (1994).
238. Id. at 673, 442 S.E.2d at 492. See also O.C.G.A. § 17-5-31 (1990) which provides:
"No search warrant shall be quashed or evidence suppressed because of a technical
irregularity not affecting the substantial rights of the accused." Id.
239. 212 Ga. App. at 672-73, 442 S.E.2d at 492.
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A deliberately false or misleading affidavit for a search warrant can
result in suppression of the evidence. In Peters v. State,24 the affidavit for a search warrant indicated the informant from whom the
information was gained was reliable because the informant had given
information in the past which had led to the seizure of drugs. The
defense, however, figured out who the informant was. The only
information the informant had ever given dealing with the seizure of
drugs was when the informant himself was arrested and drugs were
seized from him.2" Excising from the affidavit that deliberately or
recklessly false support for the veracity of the informant, 2 the court
found insufficient evidence to establish probable cause.'
Courts have held that a search warrant for a dwelling extends to
automobiles on the curtilage of the premises to be searched.2 4" However, defining the curtilage, especially in an apartment complex, mobile
home park, or similar area, can be tricky. In Bayshore v. State,2' the
police had a search warrant for defendant's apartment. They executed
the search warrant with no luck. They next searched defendant who
had been leaning against a car in a common area of the parking lot and
a bag on the hood of the car. The officers found stolen property.'
Unfortunately, the court found the common area was not part of the
curtilage and reversed because the search of the defendant, the car, and
the bag within defendant's constructive possession were not authorized
by the search warrant.2 47 "When the area in question is a common
area serving multiple dwellings, it is less likely that the residents of any
one unit have an expectation of privacy or reasonably consider the area
to be an extension of the dwelling."24
But what if the officers had seized Bayshore where he stood, in close
proximity to his apartment, and returned him, and possibly the bag in
his constructive possession, to the apartment for the execution of the

240.

213 Ga. App. 488, 445 S.E.2d 290 (1994).

241. Id. at 489, 445 S.E. at 291.
242. Id. (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978)).
243. Id. at 490, 445 S.E.2d at 292.
244. Bellamy v. State, 134 Ga. App. 340, 214 S.E.2d 383 (1975).
245. 208 Ga. App. 828, 432 S.E.2d 251 (1993).
246. Id. at 828, 432 S.E.2d at 252.
247. Id. at 829, 432 S.E.2d at 253.
248. Id., 432 S.E.2d at 252. The court noted that this area presents
a "unique twist in the law" because in the usual case the government argues the
area searched was not within the curtilage of a home and therefore could be
searched without a warrant... however, [in Bayshore] the state argues that the
common area where the defendant was standing during the search was part of the
curtilage and thus defendant and the bag in his constructive possession were
covered by the search warrant for the apartment. Id.

182

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

search warrant? The facts in Martin v. State24 are similar to these;
however, the search warrant included the defendant's person in Martin,
and Martin was seen leaving the premises. The seizure, return of less
than one mile, and subsequent search of Martin and his automobile were
upheld2 ° under the authority of Michigan v. Summers.251 However,
the court reached an opposite result in State v. Crank.252 In Crank the
facts were somewhat similar; however, the distance from the residence
to where the car was stopped was two to three miles. 5 The court
distinguished this case from Michigan v. Summers because in Crank
there was a greater distance, greater public stigma on a public road, and
no magistrate had found that Crank likely had contraband on his person
The court also noted that Crank had
or in his car at that location.'
not been the driver of the automobile, and Crank had not been given the
option of allowing the driver to leave with his car."5 The search of
Crank's car was therefore illegal and the supression order affirmed."6
Frequently, either out of deference to the wisdom of codefendant's
counsel, in order to expedite, or out of laziness, a lawyer will file a
motion adopting a codefendant's motions, including possibly a codefendant's motion to suppress. This is a dangerous practice for defense
counsel, as illustrated in Tackett v. State. 7 In Tackett codefendant
Adams adopted Tackett's motion to suppress. The search warrant
executed by the officers had been aimed primarily at Tackett and his
residence. The officers incidentally searched Adams' purse and found
marijuana." Adams argued in the motion to suppress that there was
no basis to search her or her purse because she was not named in the
warrant and there was no independent probable cause for the search of
her purse." The trial court made short work of Adams' argument,
finding that her challenge was not stated in the motion to suppress.26

249. 211 Ga. App. 849, 440 S.E.2d 736 (1994).
250. Id. at 850-51, 440 S.E.2d at 737.
251. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
252. 212 Ga. App. 246, 441 S.E.2d 531 (1994).
253. Id. at 248, 441 S.E.2d at 532.
254. Id. at 249, 441 S.E.2d at 533.
255. Id. at 250, 441 S.E.2d at 534.
256. Id.
257. 211 Ga. App. 664, 440 S.E.2d 74 (1994).
258. Id. at 665, 440 S.E.2d at 75.
259. Id. at 667, 440 S.E.2d at 76.
260. Id. See also O.C.GA. § 17-5-30(b) (1990) which provides:
The motion shall be in writing and state facts showing that the search and
seizure were unlawful. The judge shall receive evidence out of the presence of the
jury on any issue of fact necessary to determine the motion; and the burden of
proving that the search and seizure were lawful shall be on the state. If the
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"Although the motion to suppress contained details regarding Tackett's
arguments, neither the arguments asserted ... [by Adams] nor the

pertinent facts thereto were presented in the motion to suppress."2 1
The court262
therefore affirmed the trial court's denial of Adams' motion to
suppress.

The exclusionary rule in Georgia is not merely based on constitutional
principles, but was enacted by the legislature and is codified at Official
Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 17 -5-30. 263 For this
reason, the court in Gary v. State2" last year held that the "Good
Faith" exception to the exclusionary rule of United States v. Leon' is
not applicable in Georgia. 2"s However, good faith may have regained
at least some vitality in King v. State. 6 7
In King the officers made a stop and arrest of defendant with an
arrest warrant for a domestic violence offense.s On making the stop,
the officer noted a strong odor of alcohol on defendant. As a result,
defendant was arrested and convicted for D.U.I. 5 " The defense
challenged the arrest and breath test as the product of an illegal
warrant not supported by probable cause in the affidavit.270 The court
essentially pretermitted that issue and upheld the stop, arrest, and
resulting breath test for a number of rather vague reasonsY At least

motion is granted the property shall be restored, unless otherwise subject to
lawful detention, and it shall not be admissible in evidence against the movant in
any trial.

Id.
261.

211 Ga. App. at 667, 440 S.E.2d at 76.

262. Id.
263. O.C.G.A. § 17-5-30 (1990) provides:
A defendant aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the court
for the return of property, the possession of which is not otherwise unlawful, and
to suppress as evidence anything so obtained on the grounds that:
(1) The search and seizure without a warrant was illegal; or
(2) The search and seizure with a warrant was illegal because the warrant is
insufficient on its face, there was not probable cause for the issuance of the
warrant, or the warrant was illegally executed.
Id.
264. 262 Ga. 573, 422 S.E.2d 426 (1992).
265. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
266. 262 Ga. at 574, 422 S.E.2d at 428.
267. 211 Ga. App. 12, 438 S.E.2d 93 (1993).
268. Id. at 13, 438 S.E.2d at 94.

269.
270.
271.
motion

Id. at 12, 438 S.E.2d at 94.
Id. at 13, 438 S.E.2d at 94.
In addition to good faith, the case was partly decided on deficiencies in the defense
to suppress, and on attenuation. Id, at 14-15, 438 S.E.2d at 95. A "but for"

analysis is not appropriate under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, "[rlather, the
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one of those reasons was that the officer made the stop in good faith
reliance on the warrant, and the arrest was the result of an independent
investigation of the defendant's driving offense after the stop. 2 The
court conceded that Gary would require the suppression of tangible
property seized as a result of such an arrest.273 However, the court
held that "although the compelled administration of a breath test
implicates Fourth Amendment rights, O.C.G.A. section 17-5-30 does not
govern motions to suppress such evidence." 74 Inasmuch as the
holding in Gary is specifically based upon the'application of O.C.G.A.
section 17-5-30, it is inappropriate here.275
Electronic Surveillance. In order for wiretap evidence to be admissible, there must be strict compliance by law enforcement with both state
and federal law. 7 In Porter v. State,277 state agents failed to immediately turn the recordings over for sealing to the judge who had issued
the intercept orders.278 The agents rendered the tapes incapable of
further recording and sealed the tapes themselves. They delivered the
sealed tapes to the judge some three weeks after the wiretap operation
ceased. Thereupon the judge inspected and sealed the tapes.27 9 No
explanation for the delay was made. This was insufficient compliance.
The seals by the police do not substitute for judicial seals.' The later
judicial seals were not placed on the tapes immediately after the
operation ceased," 1 and there was no burden on defendant to show

more apt question in such a case is whether, granting establishment of the primary
illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation
of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the

primary taint." Id. at 13, 438 S.E.2d at 95 (quoting from Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963)).
272. Id. at 13, 438 S.E.2d at 95.
273. Id. at 14, 438 S.E.2d at 95.
274. Id. (citing Johnston v. State, 249 Ga. 413, 291 S.E.2d 543 (1982)).

275. Id.
276. Ellis v. State, 256 Ga. 751, 754, 353 S.E.2d 19, 22 (1987).
277. 209 Ga. App. 27, 432 S.E.2d 629 (1993).
278. Id. at 27, 432 S.E.2d at 630. See also 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (8)(c):
[tihe recording of the contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communications

under this subsection shall be done in such a way as will protect the recording
from editing or other alterations. Immediately upon the expiration of the period
of the order, or extensions thereof, such recordings shall be made available to the
judge issuing such order and sealed u278.22313

nder his directions. Custody of the recordings shall be wherever the judge orders.
Id,
279. 209 Ga. App. at 27-28, 432 S.E.2d at 630.
280.

Id. at 29, 432 S.E.2d at 631.

281. Id. at 28, 432 S.E.2d at 63 (citing United States v. Ojeda Rios, 495 U.S. 257, 260
(1990)).
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tampering or prejudice. 2 Therefore the tapes should have been
suppressed, and the court reversed.'
Not every defect in wiretap procedure results in suppression of the
evidence. In Williams v. State,2" the state neglected to make a return
on an investigation warrant for a pen register until thirty days after the
deadline. 5 However, the subject of the pen register was not the
defendant Williams, but rather his mother. The district attorney used
information from defendant's mother's pen register to get a wiretap order
for defendant. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence because of the
defect in the pen register procedure."5 The court found defendant had
no standing to assert the illegality of the pen register placed on his
mother's telephone. 7 "When the voice of an individual is not heard
and the tap is not on his premises, he has no standing."25
The investigation of a solicitation to commit murder in Jordan v.
State 9 was commenced as a result of an illegal taping of defendant's
conversation by the intended victim. Defendant's husband suspected her
of infidelity and placed a tape machine on an office phone she would use.
This produced a tape of a conversation between defendant and a third
party in which defendant discussed overdosing her husband on his heart
medication. The intended victim sought assistance from the Georgia
Bureau of Investigation ("G.B.I."). The G.B.I. supplied an undercover
"hit man," and ultimately defendant was arrested and convicted of
solicitation to commit murder.' 0 Defendant moved to suppress the
evidence obtained by the intended victim's illegal phone surveil-

282. Id. at 29-30, 432 S.E.2d at 631-32.
283. Id. at 31, 432 S.E.2d at 633.
284. 211 Ga. App. 8, 438 S.E.2d 126 (1993).
285. Id. at 9, 438 S.E.2d at 127. See also O.C.G.A. § 16-11-64(b)(6) which provides:
The applicant for the warrant shall return same and report back to the judge
issuing same within 30 days of the issuance of the warrant. In the event no
evidence of one of the specific crimes set forth in this Code section has been
obtained through the use of such device or devices, it shall be the duty of the
applicant physically to destroy all evidence obtained by surveillance and to certify
that fact in writing to the judge under oath.
286. 211 Ga. App. at 9-10, 438 S.E.2d at 127.
287. Id.
288. Id. (quoting Ellis v. State, 256 Ga. 751, 755, 353 S.E.2d 19, 22 (1987)).
289. 211 Ga. App. 86, 438 S.E.2d 371 (1994).
290. Id. at 90, 438 S.E.2d at 374. See also O.C.G.A. § 16-4-7(a) (1992) which provides:
"A person commits the offense of criminal solicitation when, with intent that another
person engage in conduct constituting a felony, he solicits, requests, commands,
importunes, or otherwise attempts to cause the other person to engage in such conduct."
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lance. 291 Evidence seized unlawfully by a private individual is not
covered by the Fourth Amendment; therefore, there was no constitutionWhile government wiretaps
al basis for exclusion of the evidence.'
in Georgia must comply with both federal and state requirements,2 ' 3
the wiretap exclusionary provisions of state and federal law for illegal

private surveillance are entirely different.2" The Georgia statute
would prohibit the actual illegal tape, 5 but the statute contains no
"Even
prohibition of evidence derived from the illegal surveillance.'
under the federal provisions, if an improper wiretap is initiated by a

private individual without the pre-knowledge and acquiescence of law
enforcement authorities, this will not preclude use by the government of
the knowledge obtained thereby."' Therefore the subsequent investigation and tapes, all derived from the initial illegal surveillance by the
intended victim, were admissible9S8
Defendant's Statements. "To make a confession admissible, it must
have been made voluntarily, without being induced by another by the

291. 211 Ga. App. at 88,438 S.E.2d at 373. See also O.C.G.A. § 16-11-62(1), (5) (1992)
which provides:
It shall be unlawful for:
(1) Any person in a clandestine manner intentionally to overhear, transmit, or
record or attempt to overhear, transmit, or record the private conversation of
another which shall originate in any private place.
(5) Any person to divulge to any unauthorized person or authority the content
or substance of any private message intercepted lawfully in the manner provided
for in Code Section 16-11-65.
Id.
292. 211 Ga. App. at 91, 438 S.E.2d at 375.
293. See supra note 292.
294. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2515 (1994) provides in part:
(Wherever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of the
contents of such communications and no evidence derived therefrom may be
received in evidence in any trial.... before any court... of the United States, a
State, ... if the disclosure of that information would be in violation of this
chapter.
But see O.C.G.A. § 16-11-67 (1992) which provides in part: "[nlo evidence
obtained in any manner which violates any of the provisions of this part shall be
admissible in any court of this state...." Id. (There is no language prohibiting
evidence derived from illegal surveillance).
295. Actually this was not an issue as the trial judge found it would have been
inevitably discovered because the third party to the taped conversation voluntarily became
a state witness before she was arrested. 211 Ga. App. at 89, 438 S.E.2d at 373.
296. Id. at 89, 438 S.E.2d at 374.
297. Id. at 90, 438 S.E.2d at 374 (citing United States v. Manning, 542 F.2d 685, 686
(6th Cir. 1976); United States v. Clegg, 509 F.2d 605, 609 (5th Cir. 1975)).
298. Id. at 91, 438 S.E.2d at 375.
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Nevertheless,
slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury."'
the use of "artifice, trick, or deception" by the state does not render a
confession inadmissible, "so long as the means employed to procure them
are not calculated to elicit an untrue statement."300 In Berry u.
State,30 1 defendant's claim that his custodial statement was the result
of lies and deceit by the officers did not necessitate exclusion of the
evidence 0 2 The factual details, however, are not reported in the
decision. 30 3
Judge Beasley and the defendant in Adcock v. State' were vindicated in "Chapter Two" of that case. 05 When last we left Adcock, 30 6 she
had prevailed in her paternity and child support suit against her father,
only to be convicted of incest herself.0 7 In her paternity action the
trial court had compelled her to answer questions on cross examination
about instances of incest which ocurred within the statute of limitation
even though such instances had no bearing on the issue of paternity.
The compulsion threatened by the court was dismissal of her action if
she did not respond.' 8 Though Adcock had an attorney, he did not
know she could refuse to answer or was too meek to press an objection.0" Defendant's confessions of incest at the paternity trial were
action to convict her of incest. The court of appeals
used in a31criminal
0
affirmed.

The supreme court reversed the court of appeals and the conviction in
Adcock v. State,"'1 adopting Judge Beasley's dissent as the reason for
the decision.312 Judge Beasley's dissent was based entirely on the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and not the state constitutional
protection. 1 3 The trial judge's determination that the confessions were
voluntary was clearly erroneous: the confessions were compelled by
threat of economic sanction when the trial judge erroneously advised
Adcock that the consequences of not answering the irrelevant questions
299. O.C.GA. § 24-3-50 (1982).
300.

Berry v. State, 210 Ga. App. 789, 790, 437 S.E.2d 630, 632 (1993).

301. Id.
302. Id. at 790, 437 S.E.2d at 632.

303. Id.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.

208 Ga. App. 346, 430 S.E.2d 606 (1993).
208 Ga. App. at 350, 430 S.E.2d at 609 (Beasley, J., dissenting).
Frank C. Mills, IU, CriminalLaw, 45 MERCER L. REV. 135, 177-78 (1993).
208 Ga. App. at 348, 430 S.E.2d at 608.
Id. at 34748, 430 S.E.2d at 607-08.
Id. at 352, 430 S.E.2d at 611 (Beasley, J., dissenting).
Id, at 350, 430 S.E.2d at 609.
Adcock v. State, 263 Ga. at 760, 438 S.E.2d at 911.
Id.
208 Ga. App. at 351-53, 430 S.E.2d at 609-11 (Beasley, J., dissenting).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

about 4 subsequent episodes of incest would be the dismissal of her
31

suit.

"[11f the individual [being questioned] states that he wants an
attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present."3 15
Furthermore, "once a suspect invokes his Fifth Amendment right to
counsel, not only must the interrogation cease, but the police cannot
reinterrogate or otherwise initiate contact designed to produce incriminating statements."3 6 In Wilson v. State, 17 the police questioned
defendant about a murder four times, each time advising him of his
rights. At the third interview, defendant invoked his right to counsel.
Sometime thereafter defendant was arrested on an unrelated matter.
He was questioned for the fourth time one year after the murder.
Defendant terminated the interview "by indicating only that he did not
want to talk to investigators any more."318 Thereafter, defendant was
transferred to a state prison where the police planted an informant in
his prison cell. The informant succeeded in eliciting incriminating
statements. 19 Under the principles of law cited above, the statements
seemingly should have been suppressed as violative of defendant's right
to counsel. However, one additional distinguishing factor made a big
difference. There was a break in custody of seven months between
defendant's invoking of his right to counsel and the successful interrogation."0 The court held that
[an) exception to the requirement that all police interrogation cease
after the right to counsel is invoked arises where there is a break in
custody. Because of the absence or dissipation of coercion once a
suspect is released from custody, subsequent confessions obtained from
even police initiated interrogation are admissible without violating the
suspect's fifth amendment rights if there has been an intervening
break in custody.321
On rebuttal, the defendant in Smith v. State322 rather insistently
contended that his statement to police had been coerced. Defendant had
not objected to admissibility nor had he insisted on a Jackson-Denno

314. Id. at 347-48, 430 S.E.2d at 606-07.
315. Wilson v. State, 264 Ga. 287, 289, 444 S.E.2d 306, 309 (1994) (quoting Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966)).
316. Id. (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981)).
317. Id.
318. Id. at 288, 444 S.E.2d at 308.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 290, 444 S.E.2d at 309.
321. Id. at 289, 444 S.E.2d at 309.
322. 263 Ga. 782, 439 S.E.2d 483 (1994).
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hearing. The court granted the state's motion 'for mistrial because the
jury had heard defendant's contentions.'
The trial court determined
such matters were irrelevant for the trial jury because no objection to
admissibility had been made.' 24 Not only was such evidence not
mistrial material, it was highly relevant and material to the probative
value of the statement and, therefore, to the issue of guilt or innocence." Consequently, there was no manifest necessity for mistrial.
Jeopardy had attached, barring retrial."'6
Representation by Counsel: Indigent Defense. The Sixth Amendment
guarantees appointment of counsel to an indigent defendant if the
defendant may be sentenced to imprisonment. 27 However, "the right
to appointed counsel in misdemeanor cases arises only when a defendant
is actually sentenced to a term of imprisonment."3 s This is true even
if the misdemeanor conviction is used to aggravate a subsequent
sentence or revoke a previously probated sentence. 29 The right to
appointed counsel continues only through direct appeal and does not
extend to the filing of a petition for certiorari."'
Disqualification of Counsel. Motions to disqualify opposing counsel
are increasing. In Stinson v. State," the trial court disqualified
retained counsel for the defendant because counsel's wife was a
supervisor for the DFACS agency which originated the child molestation
charge against the defendant.'
She signed an official document
which concluded defendant was guilty of the offense. The trial court
disqualified defense counsel, not because of an actual conflict, but
because of the potential for the appearance of impropriety.3 3 The
court of appeals reversed." 4 It is "improper to disqualify an attorney
based solely on an appearance of impropriety, particularly when the
appearance of impropriety resulted not from the attorney's conduct but
from his status as the spouse of an attorney affiliated with the opposing

323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
S.E.2d
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.

Id. at 783-84, 439 S.E.2d at 485.
Id.
Id. at 784, 439 S.E.2d at 486.
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
Id.at 37.
Peters v. State, 210 Ga. App. 211, 213, 435 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1993).
Id. at 213, 435 S.E.2d at 733 (citing Sams v. State, 162 Ga. App. 118, 119, 290
321, 322 (1982)).
Paino v. State, 263 Ga. 331, 435 S.E.2d 24 (1993).
210 Ga. App. 570, 436 S.E.2d 765 (1983).
Id. at 570, 436 S.E.2d at 766.
Id.
Id. at 571, 436 S.E.2d at 767.
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party." 5 "Absent a showing that special circumstances exist which
prevent the adequate representation of the client, disqualification based
solely on marital status is not justified.' 6 The court applied this rule
even though counsel's wife was not an attorney. In a criminal case, "the
client's interest in representation by his counsel of choice . .. is, if
anything, greater rather than less than that of a client in a civil
action." 7 The court recognized that if the spouse became a witness,
counsel could be disqualified rather than face the choice of whether or
not to cross examine his wife.' 8
On the other hand, in Chapel v. State 9 the court affirmed the trial
court's disqualification of retained and later appointed counsel, partly
Defense counsel had
because of the appearance of impropriety.'
frequently represented the county and had access to county policies,
procedures, and even personnel files of state's witnesses. Because
counsel was a former attorney for the county there was "'a serious
potential for a post-trial claim of ineffectiveness' .. . based on the
possibility that [counsel's] loyalty to or efforts on behalf of Chapel could
be threatened by his responsibilities to the county." 1 Since the
defendant initially chose and retained this particular counsel, the court
balanced objective considerations in favor of counsel's representation
against the counter balancing conflict." 2 The conflict, appearance of
impropriety, and potential for serious ineffectiveness claim outweighed
any objective reasons supporting counsel's continuing in the case.' "
Therefore, the lower court was affirmed. 9 "
In Billings v. State,"' the shoe was on the other foot. The defense
moved to disqualify the entire district attorney's office because an
assistant prosecutor, while previously a public defender, had at one time
represented a codefendant who testified for the state.' The defendant
had also been represented by the public defender. The court of appeals
conceded an appearance of impropriety existed, but refused to find that

335. Id. at 570, 436 S.E.2d at 766.
336. Id. (citing Blumonfeld v. Borenstein, 247 Ga. 406, 276 S.E.2d 607 (1981)).
337. Id. at 570-71, 276 S.E.2d at 766.
338. Id. at 571, 276 S.E.2d at 766-67.
339. 264 Ga. 267, 443 S.E.2d 271 (1994).
340. Id. at 270, 443 SE.2d at 274.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 268-69, 443 S.E.2d at 272-73. This balancing of interests is mandated by
Davis v. State, 261 Ga. 221, 403 S.E.2d 800 (1991).
343. 264 Ga. at 270, 443 S.E.2d at 273-74.
344. Id., 443 S.E.2d at 274.
345. 212 Ga. App. 125, 441 S.E.2d 262 (1994).
346. Id. at 128, 441 S.E.2d at 265.
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the district attorney's entire office should be disqualified.'
The court
aknowledged that Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility Directory
Rule 5-105(D) 8" requires that partners and associates in the same
firm as a disqualied attorney are likewise disqualified. That rule,
however, was "not meant to encompass governmental law offices ...
[because] Ithe salaried government employee does not have the financial
interest in the success of departmental representation that is inherent
in private practice." 4 9
In Jefferson v. State," defendant was before the court for re-sentencing. He asked the court to appoint different counsel claiming that
he had discharged previous counsel. 1 The trial court declined.
Defendant thereupon refused to cooperate with counsel.8 2 The court
of appeals affirmed the trial court in denying additional counsel stating:
A defendant may not refuse to co-operate with appointed counsel and
then claim he was not effectively represented. "[Any act of defendant
which effectively terminated his counsel would not have had the effect
of 'triggering' a duty upon the part of the trial court to appoint another
attorney for defendant .... " If the defendant does not have a good
reason for discharging his court-appointed attorney, the trial court does
not err in requiring him to choose between representation by an
attorney and proceeding pro se.'
Ineffectiveness of Counsel. Also in Jefferson, the fact that a client had
an ineffectiveness of counsel claim against appointed counsel or pro bono
retained counsel was not a conflict of interest,34 nor was it an objective consideration sufficient to require the court to appoint different
counsel.3 5s
Arraignment. There were two reversals of convictions as a result of
"mass arraignments." Apparently some courts, because of the volume of
cases, have taken to advising all or batches of defendants of their rights
as a group. Subsequently, the cases are taken up individually for

347. Id. at 129, 441 S.E.2d at 266.
348. GA. RuLEs OF CT. ANN., Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 5-105(D)
(1994) provides: "If a lawyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw from
employment under DR 5-105, no partner or associate of his firm may accept or continue

such employment."
349. 212 Ga. App. at 129, 441 S.E.2d at 266.
350. 209 Ga. App. 859, 434 S.E.2d 814 (1993).
351. Id. at 861, 434 S.E.2d at 816.
352. Id. at 860-61, 434 S.E.2d at 816.
353. Id. at 861,434 S.E.2d at 816 (quoting Durham v. State, 185 Ga. App. 163, 164,363
S.E.2d 607, 609 (1987)).
354. Id.
355. Id. at 862, 434 S.E.2d at 817.
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arraignment. In Waire v. State,' defendant first pleaded not guilty
with appointed counsel. Later she pleaded guilty at a mass arraignment
without counsel.857 Apparently, the court's standard questions did not
satisfactorily inquire into whether she intended to waive her right to
counsel. The lower court was reversed for not allowing her to withdraw
her plea.'
In Jones v. State, 59 defendant, at a mass arraignment, was presented with official documents informing her of her rights in great detail,
including the right to trial by jury. The judge discussed these documents with defendant and others at the mass arraignment. Defendant
was not asked specifically about whether she desired a jury trial or an
attorney. Her case was called, proceeded to bench trial, and she was
convicted of shoplifting.3"
In reversing the conviction, the court
rejected the state's contention that a waiver could be inferred by the fact
that she was advised of her rights and did not request counsel. 1 The
record was also insufficient to show a waiver of jury trial. 2 In both
cases the court stated "[iut is difficult to imagine a mass arraignment
procedure which could satisfy the trial court's burden of establishing
that a proper waiver of counsel has occurred." 63
Guilty Pleas. "Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of guilty, the
judge should not enter judgment upon such plea without making such
inquiry on the record as may satisfy him that there is a factual basis for
the plea."'
In Collum v. State,m the trial court went to great
lengths to document that it had informed defendant of his various rights
and inquired into his voluntary and intelligent waiver of those rights
prior to defendant's plea of guilty and sentence. However, the record did
not reflect that the court had ascertained a factual basis for the
plea.3"
It was reversible error for the court to deny defendant's
subsequent motion to withdraw the plea.3 6

356. 211 Ga. App. 69, 438 S.E.2d 142 (1993).
357. Id. at 70, 438 S.E.2d at 143.
358. Id. at 70-71, 438 S.E.2d at 143.
359. 212 Ga. App. 676, 442 S.E.2d 908 (1994).
360. Id. at 677-78, 442 S.E.2d at 909-10.
361. Id. at 678, 442 S.E.2d at 910.
362. Id. at 679, 442 S.E.2d at 910.
363. Jones v. State, 212 Ga. App. 676, 679, 442 S.E.2d 908, 910 (1994).
364. GA. RULES OF CT. ANN., Unif. Super. Ct. R. 33.9 (1994).
365. 211 Ga. App. 158, 438 S.E.2d 401 (1993).
366. Id. at 160, 438 S.E.2d at 403.
367. Id. Compare Holland v. State, 209 Ga. App. 821, 434 S.E.2d 808 (1993), wherein
the conviction was affirmed because the state did make a showing of a "factual basis" for
the plea. What makes Holland interesting, though, is that the court considered contact
between the defendant's penis and the victim's anus through clothes and no "skin-to-skin"
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Demurrer. There is no such thing as a motion for summary judgment
in Georgia criminal law.'
When a demurrer to an indictment is filed
which inserts facts not apparent on the face of the indictment, it is
referred to as a "speaking demurrer."' 9 This is commonly used when
defense counsel wants to actually reveal the defense and demonstrate to
the court that the charge cannot be proven as a matter of law because
of some factual or legal defect in the state's case should it go to trial. In
State v. Schuman,"70 the defense contended that the case was a civil
case over a debt; in State v. Givens, 7 1 the defense challenged the legal
status of a "navigable stream" in a "no boating zone" violation.372 Both
trial judges dismissed the indictments. In both cases the court of
appeals reversed, holding that "speaking demurrers are void."373 The
court further noted that "such a demurrer presents no question for
decision, and should never be sustained."374
Discovery. All developments in previous years in the area of discovery
pale to insignificance in light of the 1994 discovery bill. 75 Indeed, the
new discovery law is probably the development of the decade in criminal
law in Georgia. Effective January 1, 1995, it will revolutionize the
practice of criminal law in Georgia as no other development of case or
statutory law has recently. The scope of this article does not allow
detailed discussion of all aspects of the bill.376 However, here are some
of the more significant provisions:

contact to be a sufficient factual basis for a sodomy plea. Id. at 823, 434 S.E.2d at 809.
In this connection compare Elrod v. State, 208 Ga. App. 787, 432 S.E.2d 808 (1993), in
which the court of appeals held that insertion of the defendant's naked penis in the victim's
naked "crack" was insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction of sodomy. Id. at 788, 432
S.E.2d at 809.
368. State v. Givens, 211 Ga. App. 71, 72, 438 S.E.2d 387, 389 (1993).
369. State v. Schuman, 212 Ga. App. 231, 233, 441 S.E.2d 466, 467 (1994), rev'd,
Schuman v. State, 264 Ga. 526,

-

S.E.2d

_

(1994).

370. Id.
371. 211 Ga. App. 71, 438 S.E.2d 387 (1993).
372. Id. at 71. 438 S.E.2d at 387.
373. Id.
374. Id., 438 S.E.2d at 389, and 212 Ga. App. at 233, 441 S.E.2d at 468; but see
Schuman v. State, 264 Ga. 526, 448 S.E.2d 694 (1994) wherein the supreme court reversed
the court of appeals. The reasoning of the court of appeals was correct as far as it went;
however, in Schuman, the state and defense agreed to submit the case to the court on an
equivalent to a motion for summary judgment. Therefore the state was bound by the
procedure to which it had agreed. The case was remanded to the trial court for a proper
determination. Id.
375. 1994 Ga. Laws 1895-1915.
376. The new discovery law alone could and no doubt will be the subject of numerous
such articles in the future. The author will attempt to hit the high spots.
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1. Present use of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated without
familiarity with the new law is difficult. Previous code sections long
relied upon have been repealed and are not in the pocket parts. The
new discovery provisions are in new chapters with new code designations. There is no easy cross reference to the new substitutes which may
correspond to the old provisions.?"
2. Discovery in felony cases is optional with the defendant. 78
3. Discovery of what is in the possession of the state is extended to
"any law enforcement agency involved in the investigation of the case
being prosecuted," not just the district attorney's file. 7 '
4. In addition to custodial statements, discovery of defendant's
statements is extended to pre-custodial statements made by the
defendant 3to
a person he knows to be a law enforcement officer or
80
prosecutor.
5. The state must furnish a copy of the defendant's G.C.I.C. report if
in the "control of the state or prosecution."38 '
6. The state must produce all tangible objects it intends to use in
evidence
in the case-in-chief, or rebuttal, or which belonged to defen82
dant.3

7. The state is provided
with reciprocal discovery of tangible objects
3
and some other matters. 8
3 e4
8. The state is provided alibi discovery.

377. For example, O.C.G.A. § 17-7-110 in the pocket parts is shown as repealed with
reference to Ga. L. 1994, p. 1895 § 1, effective January 1, 1995. There is no cross reference
to the new comparable provision O.C.G.A. § 17-6-3 dealing with supplying a copy of the
indictment and list of witnesses.
378. Future O.C.G.A. § 17-6-2 (1995), applicable only where there is at least one felony
count. However if one defendant opts for discovery, others must also comply. This will
increase the number of severance hearings.
379. Future O.C.G.A. § 17-6-1(1) (1995). See generally 1994 Ga. Laws 1895-1915.
380. Future O.C.G.A. § 17-6-4(a)(1) (1995). See generally 1994 Ga. Laws 1895-1915.
Apparently this does not apply to statements made to undercover agents or informants
even within the jail. That will be the subject of litigation.
381. Future O.C.G.A. § 17-6-4(a)(2) (1995). See generally 1994 Ga. Laws 1895-1915.
Such records are by definition in control of the state.
382. Future O.C.G.A. § 17-6-4(G)(3) (1995). See generally 1994 Ga. Laws 1895-1915.
383. Future O.C.G.A. § 17-6-4(G)(1X2) (1995). See generally 1994 Ga. Laws 1895-1915.
384. Future O.C.G.A. § 17-6-5 (1995). See generally 1994 Ga. Laws 1895-1915. For a
clue as to what extent this discovery may be enforced by the state, see Johnson v. State,
262 Ga. 527, 529-30, 422 S.E.2d 648, 649-50 (1992), wherein it was reversible error for the
court to disallow defendant's psychiatrist's testimony and insanity defense because of late
compliance with Unif. Super. Ct. R. 31.4. Id. See also Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308
(1974); .Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S 284, 295 (1973) and Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S.
95, 97 (1979), which held that state evidentiary requirements may not work to deprive a
defendant of due process. Id. As a practical matter, unless there is ironclad documented
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9. Production of witness statements by both the state and the defense
is required, even at pretrial hearings.'
10. There is a separate article for misdemeanor discovery.'
11. There is an extensive revision of the provisions for depositions in
criminal cases. 7
12. There are many additional provisions-some major, some vague,
some of indeterminable effect.388
Change of Venue. Two cases of note dealt with procedural issues in
changes of venue, both resulting in reversals of trial court decisions. In
Freeman v. State,' the trial judge denied the motion for change of
venue in the case then before the court; but on its own motion the court
announced that venue would be changed for trials of defendant's two
subsequent cases.' ° The supreme court reversed because a judge is
only authorized to change venue on his own motion when "in his
judgment, there is danger of violence being committed on the defendant."3 9' This must be based on circumstances as of the time of
trial. 92
In Hardwick v. State,393 the supreme court clarified the construction
of O.C.G.A. section 17-7-150(a)3 4 and ruled that if a trial court
granted a change of venue, the judge was not bound to change venue to
a county agreed upon by the state and the defense. 395 The trial court
is authorized to consider factors such as "financial, travel, security and

evidence of the defendant's personal decision to forego an alibi defense, a judge will be hard
pressed to exclude a late alibi based upon late or no compliance with this discovery
provision. A decision or negligence by the attorney would likely lead to a successful
ineffective assistance claim if later challenged.
385. Future O.C.G.A. § 17-6-7. See generally 1994 Ga. Laws 1895-1915.
386. Future O.C.G.A. § 17-6-20. See generally 1994 Ga. Laws 1895-1915.
387. Future O.C.G.A. § 24-10-130. See generally 1994 Ga. Laws 1895-1915.
388. The effect of much of this statute is difficult to determine. In the author's opinion,
the biggest effect will be not in the substance of what is gained or lost by either the state
or defense, but in the cost in man power or delays caused by myriads of additional hearings
dealing with sanctions for failure to comply or failure to comply timely with the new
disclosure requirements and deadlines. In addition, this statute will be a shot in the arm
for appellate counsel as it will take years for an appellate record to clarify much of the
discovery law.
389. 264 Ga. 27, 440 S.E.2d 181 (1994).
390. Id. at 29, 440 S.E.2d at 184.
391. Id. at 29-30, 440 S.E.2d at 184,
392. Id.
393. 264 Ga. 161, 442 S.E.2d 236 (1994).
394. O.C.G.A. § 17-7-150(a) (1990) provides in part: "thejudge shall transfer [the case]
to any county that may be agreed upon by the prosecuting attorney and the defendant or
his counsel.. .

."

Id.

395. 264 Ga. at 162, 442 S.E.2d at 238.
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logistical burdens."39 ' However, the lower court erred in proposing to
utilize Uniform Superior Court Rule 19.2(B) in changing venue by
picking a jury in the receiving county and transporting the jury back to
the originating county for trial. 7 The supreme court concluded that
Uniform Superior Court Rule 19.2(B) is inconsistent with O.C.G.A.
section 17-7-150(a) and therefore unenforceable. 98
Speedy Trial. In a multi-count indictment, the correct speedy trial
provision is determined by the more serious offense.' 9 Thus, in Bailey
v. State,"0 because the defendant was on trial for multiple offenses
including rape, the state had to comply with O.C.G.A. section 17-7171.401 The law also requires that a case be commenced within the

statutory period, not that it be concluded. °2
It is not a valid challenge to our speedy trial laws that other counties
of similar size have more terms of court. Therefore, the defendant in
Henry v. State °" was not denied equal protection even though other

396. Id. at 164, 442 S.E.2d at 238.
397. GA. RULEs OF CT. ANN., Unif. Super. Ct. R. 19.2(B) (1994) provides:

When there has been an order granting change of venue to the superior court of
a county other than that in which the action theretofore pended, the trial jury
shall be selected from qualified jurors of the transferee county although trial of the
action may, in the discretion of the presiding judge, take place in the transferor
county.
Id.
398.
399.
400.
401.

264 Ga. at 164, 442 S.E.2d at 239.
Baily v. State, 209 Ga. App. 390, 433 S.E.2d 610 (1993).
209 Ga. App. 390, 433 S.E.2d 610 (1993).
Id., 433 S.E.2d at 612; see also O.C.G.A. § 17-7-171 which provides:
(a) Any person accused of a capital offense may enter a demand for trial at the
term of court at which the indictment is found or at the next succeeding regular
term thereafter; or, by special permission of the court, he may at any subsequent
term thereafter demand a trial.
(b) If more than two regular terms of court are convened and adjourned after the
term at which the demand is filed and the defendant is not given a trial then he
shall be absolutely discharged and acquitted of the offense charged in the
indictment, provided that at both terms there were juries impaneled and qualified
to try the defendant and provided, further, that the defendant was present in
court announcing ready for trial and requesting a trial ont he indictment.
(c) In cases involving a capital offense for which the death penalty is sought,
if a demand for trial is entered, the counting of terms under subsection (b) of this
Code section shall not begin until the convening of the first term following the
completion of pretrial review proceedings in the Supreme Court under Code
Section 17-10-35.1.

Id.
402. 209 Ga. App. at 392, 433 S.E.2d at 613.
403. 263 Ga. 417, 434 S.E.2d 469 (1993).
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courts held court more frequently than in Douglas County (where his
case was pending).4°
Once a demand for speedy trial is filed, "[a] waiver of the demand
would result from a continuance granted on motion of the accused, or
from any other act on his part showing affirmatively that he consented
to passing the case until a subsequent term." 5 Filing a motion to
suppress is not such a waiver," 8 and if successful and appealed by the
state, it, at most, tolls the time requirements of the statute. 40 7 In
Ballew v. State,40° the state did not appeal, so the time limit for trial
was not tolled.0 ' As defendant was410not tried within the time limits,
defendant was entitled to discharge.
If a case goes up on appeal of some issue after a demand for speedy
trial has been filed and is returned for trial, when does a previously
pending demand for speedy trial become effective: when the remittitur
is filed, or when the judgment on remittitur is filed? In Ramirez v.
State,411 the court of appeals ruled that the demand became operative
when the remittitur was made the order of the lower court.1 2 As the
defendant was tried within two terms of that date, he was not entitled
to discharge and acquittal.4 3
A demand for speedy trial is not defective because it fails to use the
magic words "speedy trial" or other such similar heading in the
motion.414 Thus in Aranza v. State,415 defendant's demand for speedy
trial was not defective for having the caption "Demand for Trial by
Jury."41 6 However, the demand for speedy trial was defective for failing

404. Id. at 417, 434 S.E.2d at 470.
405. Ballew v. State, 211 Ga. App. 672, 673, 440 S.E.2d 76, 78 (1994); see also Riley v.
State, 212 Ga. App. 51-, 520, 442 S.E.2d 7, 8 (1994).

406.
407.
408.
409.

211 Ga. App. at 673, 440 S.E.2d at 78.
Id.
211 Ga. App. 672, 440 S.E.2d 76 (1994).
Id.

410. Id. at 674, 440 S.E.2d at 78.
411. 211 Ga. App. 356, 439 S.E.2d 4 (1993).
412. Id. at 356, 439 S.E.2d at 4. But see Henry v. State, 264 Ga. 527, 449 S.E.2d 79
(1994). Henry held that the demand becomes effective on filing the remittitur, but allows
"... the remainder of that term and one additional regular term of court in which to try
the defendant pursuant to his demand for trial .... " Id. at 531, 449 S.E.2d at 82.

413. Id. See also Fletcher v. State, 213 Ga. App. 401, 403, 445 S.E.2d 279, 281 (1994)
(holding that after a remittitur has been returned, any partial term of court remaining in
which no jurors are impanelled does not count for purposes of terms allowed for trial under
a demand for speedy trial). Id.
414. Aranza v. State, 213 Ga. App. 192, 193, 444 S.E.2d 349, 349 (1994).

415. Id.
416. Id. at 193, 444 S.E.2d at 349. Compare the requirement in discovery motions for
just such magic words. In Delay v. State, 213 Ga. App. 199, 200, 444 S.E.2d 140, 141
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to specify "the charges upon which Aranza demanded a speedy trial by
'name, date, term of court, or case number.'"417 Therefore, defendant
was not entitled to discharge and acquittal as "'[sluch a demand cannot
reasonably be construed as sufficient to put the authorities on notice of
a defendant's
intention to invoke the extreme sanction' of O.C.G.A. § 177.170. "4'8
Defendant'sPresence,Pre-trialMotions. It has long been held that the
defendant may be found to have waived his presence by voluntarily
absenting himself during trial after the jury has been selected.41 9
However, in Deal v. State,4 20 defendant, who was free on bond, failed
to appear for a pretrial Jackson-Dennohearing. Defense counsel agreed
to proceed with the hearing in defendant's absence. The trial court ruled
the defendant's statement was admissible.421 Defendant on appeal
challenged the holding of the Jackson-Denno hearing in his absence.
The court of appeals reversed holding that "[pirior to trial a defendant's
failure to appear is handled with bench warrants and bond forfeitures
....
During trial, a voluntary absence is treated as a waiver of the
right of confrontation."422 It was, therefore, error for the court to hold
the Jackson-Denno hearing in defendant's absence.423
Continuances. Is a defendant entitled, at trial, to a transcript of a
previous preliminary hearing or previous trial? That is still an
unanswered question in Georgia. In Moreland v. State,424 defendant,
who was indigent, asked for a continuance for time to obtain a copy of
a transcript of a prior mistrial. The trial court acknowledged that
defendant would be entitled to a free transcript, if at all, but denied a
continuance due to the simplicity of the case. 425 The court of appeals
noted "as a matter of equal protection an indigent defendant must be
provided with a transcript of prior proceedings when the transcript is

(1994), the defendant's demand for statements of the accused was defective for failing to
refer to the appropriate code section (O.C.G.A. § 17-7-210) and for failure to state that the
statements should be supplied 10 days before trial. Id.
417. 213 Ga. App. at 193, 444 S.E.2d at 349.
418. Id. (quoting Ferris v. State, 172 Ga. App. 729, 731, 324 S.E.2d 762, 764 (1984)).
419. Winfield v. State, 210 Ga. App. 849,437 S.E.2d 849 (1993); Gee v. State, 212 Ga.
App. 422, 442 S.E.2d 290 (1994); Byrd v. Ricketts, 233 Ga. 779, 780, 213 S.E.2d 610, 611
(1975); Fictum v. State, 188 Ga. App. 348, 349, 373 S.E.2d 54,55 (1988).
420. 213 Ga. App. 131, 443 S.E.2d 713 (1994).
421. Id. at 131, 443 S.E.2d at 714.
422. Id. at 132, 443 S.E.2d at 714-15 (citing Pollard v. State, 175 Ga. App. 269, 270,
333 S.E.2d 152, 153 (1985)).
423. 213 Ga. App. at 132, 443 S.E.2d at 715.
424. 213 Ga. App. 75, 443 S.E.2d 701 (1994).
425. Id. at 75, 443 S.E.2d at 702.
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2 An argument that the defenneeded for an effective defense ...
dant should have a good memory or take perfect notes will not prevail,
and it can be assumed that a transcript is a valuable right for discovery
and for impeachment.4 27 However, in Moreland, the issue was not
equal protection, but a continuance. As the defendant showed no harm,
the denial of the continuance was at most harmless error.4'e
In order to prevail in a motion for continuance for absence of a
witness, there must be technical compliance with O.C.G.A. section 17-7192.429 In Grant v. State,' the trial court was overly technical in
denying a continuance because the defense did not show that its missing
witness was under subpoena. However, defendant had obtained an order
431
of production for the witness who was under state incarceration.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court and the conviction holding
that "[the production order of the superior court issue pursuant to
O.C.G.A. § 24-10-61 was sufficient, in lieu of a subpoena ... to
demonstrate appellants due diligence in compliance with the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 17-8-25. "4 2

B.

Trial

Voir dire. Reduced Strikes. In 1992 the general assembly
changed the number of strikes in felony cases from ten for the prosecution and twenty for the defense to six and twelve respectively.433

426. Id. at 76,443 S.E.2d at 702 (quoting Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 (1971)).
427. Id.
428. Id. at 77, 443 S.E.2d at 703.
429. O.C.G.A. § 17-8-25 (1990) provides:
In all applications for continuances upon the ground of the absence of a witness,
it shall be shown to the court that the witness is absent; that he has been
subpoenaed; that he does not reside more than 100 miles from the place of trial
by the nearest practical route; that his testimony is material; that the witness is
not absent by the permission, directly or indirectly, of the applicant; that the
applicant expects he will be able to procure the testimony of the witness at the
next term of the court; that the application is not made for the purpose of delay
but to enable the applicant to procure the testimony of the absent witness; and the
application must state the facts expected to be proved by the absent witness.
Id.
430. 212 Ga. App. 565, 442 S.E.2d 898 (1994).
431. Id. at 566, 442 S.E.2d at 900.
432. Id. at 567, 442 S.E.2d at 900.
433. 1992 Ga. Laws 1981. See also O.C.G.A. § 15-12-160 (1994):
When any person stands indicted for a felony, the court shall have impaneled
30 jurors from which the defense and prosecution may strike jurors; provided,
however, in any case in which the state announces its intention to seek the death
penalty, the court shall have impaneled 42 jurors from which the defense and

200

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

Naturally, a number of questions arose as to whether this new jury
selection process was prospective, that is, applicable only to crimes
committed after enactment of the new law or retroactive to all cases not
yet tried. A number of cases resolved this issue, most significantly
Barner v. State."4 The court held since "peremptory strikes are a
procedural rather than a substantive right" the new statute was
retroactive to all cases pending regardless of the date on which the crime
occurred."
Batson. There was not much new development in the area of
Batson43 under state law.437 However in Lingo v. State," s there
was an "overwhelming pattern" of strikes against blacks by the state,
requiring the prosecutor to present "'concrete, tangible, race-neutral and
neutrally applied' reasons for strikes exercised against black venire
members."4 9 The supreme court paid lip service to the court of
appeals case of Strozier v. Clark4' to the effect that "where raciallyneutral and neutrally applied reasons are given for a strike, the
simultaneous existence of any racially motivated explanation results in
a Batson violation."" 1 The supreme court refused to extend Strozier

state may strike jurors. If, for any reason, after striking from the panel there

remain less than 12 qualified jurors to try the case, the presiding judge shall
summon such numbers of persons who are competent jurors as may be necessary
to provide a full panel. In making up the panel or successive panels, the presiding
judge shall draw the tales jurors from the jury box of the county and shall order
the sheriff to summon them.
Id.
434. 263 Ga. 365, 434 S.E.2d 484 (1993); see also Lysf~ord v. State, 208 Ga. App. 811,
432 S.E.2d 247 (1993) (which upheld striking from a full panel of 30 instead of 42); Seats
v. State, 210 Ga. App. 74, 435 S.E.2d 286 (1993); Stargel v. State, 210 Ga. App. 619, 436
S.E.2d 786 (1993).
435. 263 Ga. at 367, 434 S.E.2d at 487.
436. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
437. But see J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994) (Batson made
applicable to peremptory challenges based on gender).
438. 263 Ga. 664, 437 S.E.2d 463 (1993).
439. Id. at 665-66, 437 S.E.2d at 466 (quoting Ford v. State, 262 Ga. 558, 560, 423
S.E.2d 245, 247 (1992)).
440. 206 Ga. App. 85, 424 S.E.2d 368 (1992).
441. 263 Ga. at 668, 437 S.E.2d at 467. Noting that
Strozier... states that a racially motivated explanation for striking a juror will
invalidate the entire jury selection, even though the racially-neutral explanation
[Wihere it can be determined that the racially-neutral
is also given ....
explanation is, in fact, pretextual since there is a racially motivated reason that
can be independently determined, the jury selection process is invalid under
Batson.
Id. at 669 n.4, 437 S.E.2d at 468 n.4.
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to a "presumption that any reason for striking a black juror, not also
used against a white juror-regardless of other reasons for striking a
black juror-is per se racially motivated." 4 2 Rather, the court held
"[wihere there are multiple reasons for striking a juror, white or black,
it cannot be presumed that a reason applied to one juror, of one race, but
not applied to another juror of another race, is racially motivated."" 3
The determination remains very subjective and in Lingo, the supreme
court deferred to the trial court's determination as to several relatively
weak explanations by the prosecutor.4 "
But what about totally subjective explanations, for example "I didn't
like his looks" or "he acted suspicious" or "she had a bad attitude?" In
Berry v. State,"5 the state offered as a racially neutral explanation for
many strikes that it admittedly struck women over the age of fifty. The
state struck these women because they may be less likely to believe the
state's "jail-bird witnesses" and that the defense counsel may be more
appealing to older women. Another black juror was excused because she
was "hostile." Finally, the state excused one juror to get to the next
juror. The trial court found these reasons to be neutral, and the
supreme court affirmed.4' What is interesting about this case is the
irony of the "racially neutral" explanation which is sexually non-neutral,
that is, admittedly striking women because of their sex." 7 In Justice
Benham's concurrence," 8 he proposes that the court adopt a rule
adopted in Arizona that "a facially neutral, but wholly subjective, reason
for a peremptory strike... must be coupled with some form of objective
verification before it can overcome the prima facie showing of discrimination."" 9 He would also make it the burden of the party relying on
such a subjective reason to be sure that such objective supporting
evidence is in the record.45 Although this rule was not adopted by the
court, it is imminently reasonable and, if nothing else, good advice to the
practitioner.

442. Id. at 668, 437 S.E.2d at 467.
443. Id. at 668-69, 437 S.E.2d at 468.
444. Id. at 669, 437 S.E.2d at 468.
445. 263 Ga. 493, 435 S.E.2d 433 (1993).
446. Id. at 493-94, 435 S.E.2d at 435.
447. But see J.E.B. v. Alabama, ex. rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994) (though apparently
the defense did not challenge sex strikes).
448. 263 Ga. at 909, 435 S.E.2d at 435 (Benham, J., concurring).
449. Id. at 910, 435 S.E.2d at 436 (quoting State v. Cruz, 857 P.2d 1249, 1253 (Ariz.
1993)).
450. Id.
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Evidence.
Hearsay. Hearsay evidence is incompetent and may not be used as
evidence even to revoke probation if admitted without objection.45 1 In
Goodson v. State,452 the evidence of defendant's alleged probation
violation (commission of a new offense of felony murder) was hearsay;
therefore, the revocation was reversed.45
Nevertheless, what is seemingly hearsay is often admitted into
evidence, not under any exception to the hearsay rule, and not to explain
conduct, but for the truth of the content of the statement.45 When a
witness attends a lineup and identifies a suspect, the fact of the
identification is often admitted as a vocal fact. Such a procedure was
affirmed reluctantly by the court of appeals in Neal v. State.45 In that
case, the court of appeals acknowledged that such evidence is hearsay,
recalled criticism of such evidence in Wade v. State," reaffirmed such
of
to affirm 457 the use 459
criticism, but nevertheless was "constrained"
45
Haralson v. State.
and
such evidence based on Woodard v. State
The court of appeals invited the supreme court to reverse the court of
appeals decision and these old precedents.'
There is no requirement of showing unavailability of the declarant for
the traditional codified exceptions to the hearsay rule such as res
gestae.4 " However, a showing of unavailability is typically the means
of showing "necessity" when a party seeks to admit a hearsay statement
from "necessity. 2 What does it take to show unavailability? In
Rosser v. State,4 3 the state offered and the trial court admitted a
hearsay statement from a missing witness out of "necessity." The court

451. Barnett v. State, 194 Ga. App. 892, 893, 392 S.E.2d 322, 323 (1990).
452. 213 Ga. App. 283, 444 S.E.2d 603 (1994).
453. Id. at 284, 444 S.E.2d at 604.
454. Id. at 284, 444 S.E.2d at 603-04.
455. 211 Ga. App. 829, 440 S.E.2d 717 (1994).
456. 208 Ga. App. 700, 431 S.E.2d 398 (1993).
457. 211 Ga. App. at 830, 440 S.E.2d at 719.
458. 175 Ga. App. 449, 333 S.E.2d 645 (1985).
459. 234 Ga. 406, 216 S.E.2d 304 (1975).
460. 211 Ga. App. at 830, 440 S.E.2d at 719. It is likely that the supreme court will
soon take them up on their invitation. This evidence is highly questionable when used to
establish the truth of the 'vocal fact." These cases are ripe for reversal. But see Harper
v. State, 213 Ga. App. 444, 449, 445 S.E.2d 303, 308 (1994) (officer's testimony as to vocal
fact admissible).
461. Barnett v. State, 211 Ga. App. 651, 652-53, 440 S.E.2d 247, 248 (1994).
462. McKissick v. State, 263 Ga. 188,429 S.E.2d 655 (1993) (declarant deceased); Roper
v. State, 263 Ga. 201, 429 S.E.2d 668 (1993) (declarant deceased).
463. 211 Ga. App. 402, 439 S.E.2d 72 (1993).
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of appeals noted that "necessity" is usually shown by death or noncompellability of the declarant. 4 The court also recognized authority that
"necessity" may be shown by the inability to find a witness. 5 However, in Rosser the state's missing witness was known to the state from the
day of the alleged offense, was not on a witness list, and had not been
served with a subpoena. Apparently an investigator began looking for
the declarant four days before trial and spent about "four-and-a-half to
The court found insufficient evidence of
five hours" looking for her.'
unavailability to satisfy the "necessity" requirement and reversed the
conviction because of the admission of inadmissible hearsay.47
Even where a declarant is demonstrably "unavailable," a hearsay
statement is not admissible unless there are indicia of reliability or
trustworthiness about the proffered evidence.45 In Roper v. State," 9
hearsay statements from the murder victim were admitted through the
testimony of the victim's sister. Roper is unusual because the supreme
court apparently bypassed the state's arguments for admissibility and
on its own determined that the statements were admissible from
"necessity." 7
While the victim was indisputably deceased and
therefore unavailable, the supreme court seems to have usurped the
were sufficient
initial trial court function of determining that there
42
471
The conviction was affirmed.
indicia of reliability.
Business Records. In Jackson v. State,473 a conspiracy to commit
theft by deception and arson case, the court of appeals affirmed the
admission into evidence of documents from defendant's mortgage loan
package.4 74 These documents were loan documents which originated
with the initial lender, but were admitted through the testimony of the
loan purchaser through the loan purchaser's business r'ecords. Thus, no
one appeared to qualify the records from the original lender.475 In
affirming, the court of appeals followed Lewis v. United California

464. Id. at 404, 439 S.E.2d at 73.
465. Id. (citing Adams v. State, 191 Ga. App. 16, 381 S.E.2d 69 (1989)).
466. Id. at 405-06, 439 S.E.2d at 74.
467. Id. at 406, 439 S.E.2d at 75.
468. Id. at 404, 439 S.E.2d at 73.
469. 263 Ga. 201, 429 S.E.2d 668 (1993).
470. Id. at 202, 429 S.E.2d at 670.
471. Id. at 203, 429 S.E.2d at 670. In this instance "the statements were made by the
victim to a sister in whom she placed great confidence and to whom she turned for help
with her problems ....

" Id.

472. Id.
473. 209 Ga. App. 217, 433 S.E.2d 655 (1993).
474. Id. at 222, 433 S.E.2d at 660.
475. Id. at 218, 433 S.E.2d at 657.
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Bank47 which allows "the records of one business to be admitted as
business records of another business where routine, factual documents
made by one business are transmitted and delivered to a second
business, and there entered in the regular course of business of the
receiving business."477
Scientific Evidence. The results of a penile plethysmograph test (a test
whereby a measuring gauge is placed on a subject's penis to measure
change in circumference and blood flow as a result of certain stimuli) are
not admissible in Georgia.4 78 It was reversible error in Gentry v.
State47 for the trial court to admit such evidence.'
In Gentry what
little evidence that was offered in an attempt to qualify the test showed
that reliability has not been established."
.
The prosecution discovery tool and tactical advantage created by Sabel
v. State 2 has been sharply curtailed. Under Rower v. State,4 3 no
longer does the defense have to supply to the state a list of defense
experts or supply reports unless the defense intends to call the
witness.' 4 Furthermore, under Blige v. State," the supreme court
ruled that while the state may call as a witness an expert hired by the
defense, the state may not refer to the fact that the witness was hired
by the defense.'
In response to the state's argument that the state
should be able to show the interest of the witness by source of the

476. 143 Ga. App. 126, 242 S.E.2d 581 (1978).
477. 209 Ga. App. at 219, 433 S.E.2d at 658.
478. Gentry v. State, 213 Ga. App. 24, 443 S.E.2d 667 (1994).
479. Id.
480. Id. at 25-26, 443 S.E.2d at 669.
481. Id. at 25, 443 S.E.2d at 668-69.
The test for admissibility of novel scientific evidence is whether the procedure or
technique in question has reached a scientific stage of verifiable certainty, or, in
the words of Professor Irving Younger, whether the procedure "rests upon the laws
of nature .... " Once a procedure has been recognized in a substantial number
of courts, a trial judge may judicially notice, without receiving evidence, that the
procedure has been established with verifiable certainty, or that it rests upon the
laws of nature.
Id. (quoting Harper v. State, 249 Ga. 519, 525, 292 S.E.2d 389, 395 (1982)). None of the
above was shown in Gentry.
482. 248 Ga. 10, 282 S.E.2d 61 (1981). The state was entitled, on demand, to a list of
defense expert witnesses and a copy of the expert's report(s). Id. at 18, 282 S.E.2d at 68.
Furthermore, the court in Sabel opined that "[if the defendant does not call the expert as
a witness, the state may call the defendant's expert without adding his or her name to the
list of witnesses .... " Id. at 18, 282 S.E.2d at 69.
483. 264 Ga.323, 443 S.E.2d 839 (1994) (after the survey period).
484. Id.
485. 264 Ga. 166, 441 S.E.2d 752 (1994).
486. Id. at 166-67, 441 S.E.2d at 752-53.
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be an
witness' original employment, the court held that this would
7
witness.4
its
"bolster"
to
state
the
by
attempt
impermissible
MaritalPrivilege. State v. Peters' was a murder case in which the
police offered immunity in order to compel the testimony of a likely
witness/codefendant.u 9 Defendant married the witness for the purpose
of making the witness uncompellable.490 The trial court ruled that the
witness-spouse could not be compelled to testify, and the state appealed.49 ' The court of appeals conducted an extensive review of the
legislative history of Georgia's "competent, but not compellable" law and
that of other states.49 Finally, the court concluded that there was a
potential for abuse, but the solution lay with the general assembly, not
with the courts.493 The witness-husband of the accused could not be
compelled to testify.'4
A similar tactic was attempted in Hamilton v. State,49 in which the
defendant married the twelve-year-old victim of his statutory rape .4"
Unfortunately for defendant, there is an exception to the privilege where
the defendant is charged with an offense against a minor child.497 In
this case, the spouse was the "minor child" victim. The court of appeals

487. Id. at 168, 441 S.E.2d at 753-54. Does this mean that if the defense calls a
witness from the State Crime Laboratory, the defense will not be permitted to refer to the
fact that the witness is an employee of the state and therefore a disinterested witness?
488. 213 Ga. App. 352, 444 S.E.2d 609 (1994).
489. Id. at 353, 444 S.E.2d at 609.
490. Id. See also O.C.G.A. § 24-9-23(a) (Supp. 1994) which provides: "Husband and
wife shall be competent but shall not be compellable to give evidence in any criminal
proceeding for or against each other." Id.
491. 213 Ga. App. at 354, 444 S.E.2d at 610-11.
492. Id. at 355-56, 444 S.E.2d at 612.
493. Id. at 357, 444 S.E.2d at 612-13.
494. Id., 444 S.E.2d at 613. There is certainly some incentive on the part of defendant
to make her husband a happy partner. The privilege begins and ends with the marriage
as the crucial time is not when the offense took place, but rather when the testimony is
sought to be compelled. There is no protection after divorce. Id. at 354, 444 S.E.2d at 611.
495. 210 Ga. App. 398, 436 S.E.2d 522 (1993).
496. Id. at 398, 436 S.E.2d at 523.
497. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-23(b) (Supp. 1994) provides:
The privilege created by subsection (a) of this Code section or by corresponding
privileges in paragraph (1) of Code Section 24-9-21 or subsection (a) of Code
Section 24-9-27 shall not apply in proceedings in which the husband or wife is
charged with a crime against the person of a minor child, but such person shall
be compellable to give evidence only on the specific act for which the defendant is
charged.
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construed the two statutes together and held that the witness "minorspouse-victim" was compellable. 4 8
Privileged communications between husband and wife are covered by
a different statute and can be invoked by the defendant (originator of the
communication) to prevent a spouse-witness from revealing communications made pursuant to the marital relationship.4' "Communications"
are not limited to conversations but include acts performed by a spouse
attributable to the marital relationship. Such acts include "that which
might not be spoken or done openly in public as tending to expose
personal feelings and relationships or tending to bring embarrassment
or discomfiture to the participants if done outside the privacy of the
marital relation."' 0 In White v. State,so" defendant was convicted of
several sex crimes including aggravated sodomy of his granddaughter.0 2 His wife testified on cross examination to defendant's acts of
anal sodomy with the wife during their marriage. Defendant objected,
invoking the marital communication privilege.503 The court noted
exceptions to the privilege but found none applicable.'
The court
found the acts described by the spouse to be privileged and therefore
reversible when admitted over defendant's objection. 0 5 The fact that
defendant called her as a witness for unrelated matters was not a waiver
of the privilege.' 6
Rape Shield. In Lemacks v. State,'°7 the court previously held that
prior instances of rape by other perpetrators on a victim is not "sexual
behavior" of the victim and therefore not evidence precluded by the
"Rape Shield" statute."' In Berry v. State, o the trial court did not

498. 210 Ga. App. at 399, 436 S.E.2d at 523.
499. Georgia Intl Life Ins. Co. v. Boney, 139 Ga. App. 575, 228 S.E.2d 731 (1976).
500. Id. at 579, 228 S.E.2d at 735.
501. 211 Ga. App. 694, 440 S.E.2d 68 (1994), cert. granted.
502. Id. at 694, 440 S.E.2d at 69.
503. Id. at 695-96, 440 S.E.2d at 70.
504. Id. at 696, 440 S.E.2d at 70. The following factors were listed: "(1) conversations
to or with third parties; (2) instances where the communication is actionable by one spouse
against the other; and (3) impersonal communications or actions performed without regard
to special confidence between spouses in the marital relation." Id. (quoting Boney, 139 Ga.
App. 575, 579, 228 S.E.2d 731, 735-36 (1976)).
505.

Id.

506. Id. at 696-97, 228 S.E.2d at 71.
507. 207 Ga. App. 160, 427 S.E.2d 536 (1993). See also Raines v. State, 191 Ga. App.

743, 382 S.E.2d 738 (1989).
508. 191 Ga. App. at 745, 382 S.E.2d at 739; see also O.C.G.A. § 24-2-3(b) (Supp. 1994)
which provides:

In any prosecution for rape, evidence relating to the past sexual behavior of the
complaining witness may be introduced if the court, following the procedure
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allow defendant to introduce previous instances of statutory rape on the
victim by other perpetrators.5 10 The court of appeals agreed with the
trial court that the rule in Lemacks does not apply to statutory rape as
such."' Instances of statutory rape may, in fact, be sexual behavior
and, as such, covered by the rape shield law, making it inadmissible
without compliance with that law.512
Impeachment. The supreme court held in Vincent v. State. 3 that
when the state impeaches a defense witness by establishing prior
convictions of crimes of moral turpitude, it may not bolster its impeach14
ment by gratuitously inquiring into the facts of the prior conviction.
In Paradisev. State,"5 defendant called his ex-wife as a witness, but
was ambushed by unexpected damaging testimony.515 Defendant
never had her declared a hostile witness. After she was excused, he
attempted to impeach her with prior convictions of misdemeanor bad
check. The trial court refused.5 17 The court of appeals ruled that
misdemeanor bad check. 5 is a crime of moral turpitude for purposes
of impeachment, but there was no error here. 1 9 Although "entrapment" or surprise is no longer a necessary predicate to impeaching one's

described in subsection (c)of this Code section, finds that the past sexual behavior
directly involved the participation of the accused and finds that the evidence
expected to be introduced supports an inference that the accused could have
reasonably believed that the complaining witness consented to the conduct
complained of in the prosecution.

Id.
509.
510.
511.
512.

210 Ga. App. 789, 437 S.E.2d 630 (1993).
Id. at 789, 437 S.E.2d at 632.
Id.
Id.

513. 264 Ga. 234, 442 S.E.2d 748 (1994).
514. Id. at 235, 442 S.E.2d at 750. The ruling would likely be different if the witness

volunteered an explanation of the facts and the state pursued the matter on further cross.
The court in describing the facts refers to a witness "[who has not] attempt[ed] to
rehabilitate her character by explaining the circumstances of [the] conviction .... " Id.
515. 212 Ga. App. 166, 441 S.E.2d 497 (1994).

516. Id. at 169, 441 S.E.2d at 500.
517. Id.
518. O.C.GA. § 16-9-20(a) (1992) provides:

A person commits the offense of criminal issuance of a bad check when he
makes, draws, utters, or delivers a check, draft, or order for the payment of money
on any bank or other depository in exchange for a present consideration or wages,
knowing that it will not be honored by the drawee. For the purposes of this Code

section, it is prima-facie evidence that the accused knew that the instrument
would not be honored.
Id.
519.

212 Ga. App. at 169, 441 S.E.2d at 500.
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own witness with contradictory statements, 20 that is the only way one
may impeach one's own witness without declaring the witness hostile.
Therefore, crimes of moral turpitude were not admissible.52
Finally, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court in Gardner
v. State122 to allow the state to re-open the evidence in response to jury
questions "seventeen minutes into [the jury's] deliberations."5'
Similar 7ansactions. Once again, the largest single category of
evidence appeals dealt with the admissibility of evidence of similar or
connected crimes. This category now includes evidence of "conduct
between the parties" or "prior difficulties" between the parties' 24 for
purposes of applicability of the Uniform Superior Court Rules discovery
provisions.125 Although there were dozens of such appeals, there was

520. O.C.G.A. § 24-9-81 (1982) provides:
A party may not impeach a witness voluntarily called by him, except where he
can show to the court that he has been entrapped by said witness by a previous
contradictory statement. However, in the trial of all civil cases, either plaintiff or
defendant shall be permitted to make the opposite party, or anyone for whose
immediate benefit the action is prosecuted or defended, or any agent of said party,
or agent of any person for whose immediate benefit such action is prosecuted or
defended, or officer or agent of a corporation when a corporation is such party or
for whose benefit such action is prosecuted or defended a witness, with the
privilege of subjecting such witness to a thorough and sifting examination and
with the further privilege of impeachment, as if the witness had testified in his
own behalf and were being cross-examined.
Id.
521. 212 Ga. App. at 169, 441 S.E.2d at 500.
522. 263 Ga. 197, 429 S.E.2d 657 (1993).
523. Id. at 198, 429 S.E.2d at 659.
524. Stewart v. State, 263 Ga. 843, 440 S.E.2d 452 (1994); but see a strong dissent by
Justice Hunt, joined by Justices Hunstein and Carley. Id. at 847, 440 S.E.2d at 456; see
also Loggins v. State, 260 Ga. 1, 388 S.E.2d 675 (1990); Barrett v. State, 263 Ga. 533, 436
S.E.2d 480 (1993).
525. GA. RULEs OF CT. ANN., Unif. Super. Ct. R. 31.1 (1994) provides:
All motions, demurrers, and special pleas shall be made and filed at or before
time of arraignment, unless time therefor is extended by the judge in writing prior
to trial. Notices of the state's intention to present evidence of similar transactions
or occurrences and notices of the intention of the defense to raise the issue of
insanity or mental illness, or the intention of the defense to introduce evidence of
specific acts of violence by the victim against the defendant or third persons, shall
be given and filed at least ten (10) days before trial unless the time is shortened
or lengthened by the judge. Such filing shall be in accordance with the following
procedures.
Id.
Unif. Super. Ct. R. 31.3 provides in part:
(A) The prosecution may, upon notice filed in accordance with 31.3 of these
rules, request of the court in which the accusation or indictment is pending leave
to present during the trial of the pending case evidence of similar transactions or
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not much earthshaking in the area of similar transactions during the
survey period. A few cases were notable.
Failure to object to the omission by the court of a hearing to determine
the admissibility of similar transactions does not waive that objection for
purposes of appeal. 528 However, if the defense does not object to a
failure by the state to disclose the purpose 27 for such evidence so as
to enable the court to conduct its balancing test,528 that issue may be
deemed waived.'m

occurrences.
(B) The notice shall be in writing, served upon the defendant's counsel, and
shall state the transaction, date, county, and the name(s) of the victim(s) for each
similar transaction or occurrence sought to be introduced. Copies of accusations
or indictments, if any, and guilty pleas or verdicts, if any, shall be attached to the
notice. The judge shall hold a hearing at such time as may be appropriate, and
may receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary to determine the request, out
of the presence of the jury. The burden of proving that the evidence of similar
transactions or occurrences should be admitted shall be upon the prosecution. The
state may present during the trial evidence of only those similar transactions or
occurrences specifically approved by the judge.

(C)

Evidence of similar transactions or occurrences not approved shall be

inadmissible. In every case, the prosecuting attorney and defense attorney shall
instruct their witnesses not to refer to similar crimes, transactions or occurrences,
or otherwise place the defendant's character in issue, unless specifically authorized
by the judge.
Id.
526. Riddle v. State, 208 Ga. App. 8, 11,430 S.E.2d 153, 156 (1993); White v. State, 213
Ga. App. 429, 430, 445 S.E.2d 309, 311 (1994).
527. In Barrett v. State, 263 Ga. 533, 436 S.E.2d 480 (1993), Justice Fletcher listed a
number of the legitimate reasons evidence of similar transactions can be offered:
that the crime charged is one in a series of mutually dependant crimes...; guilty
knowledge on the part of the accused; the identity of the person who has
committed the crime charged; prior attempts by the accused to commit the same
crime against the victim of the crime charged; that the crime charged was not
committed accidentally as is contended by the accused; the motive for the crime
charged; and the requisite specific intent for the crime charged.
Id. at 534,436 S.E.2d at 482 (citing Cawthon v. State, 119 Ga. 395,46 S.E. 897 (1904); and
KENNETH S. BROWN ET.AL., McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE (John W. Strong ed. 4th ed. 1992).
In addition to those listed by Justice Fletcher, the author lists the following: That the
accused was a conspirator or party to a crime, Bradford v. State, 261 Ga. 833, 412 S.E.2d
534 (1992); Bradford v. State, 262 Ga. 512, 421 S.E.2d 523 (1992); predisposition of a
defendant to commit a crime to rebut the entrapment defense, Sheppard v. State, 205 Ga.
App. 373, 422 S.E.2d 66 (1992); corroboration required for rape or for testimony of an
accomplice, Rash v. State, 207 Ga. App. 585, 428 S.E.2d 799 (1993), and Bradford, supra.
Basically all the above can be boiled down to identity, state of mind, or a combination of
the two.
528. Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640, 409 S.E.2d 649 (1991).
529. Cole v. State, 211 Ga. App. 236, 239, 438 S.E.2d 694, 697 (1993); Corey v. State,
211 Ga. App. 333, 439 S.E.2d 513 (1993). "Similar transactions" has become a very
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technical and complex area of the law of evidence; it would behoove the practitioner to have
a handy checklist of objections so as not to waive an objection by making a wrong or
imprecise one. It is always risky to compile a "laundry list" of important matters because
of the likelihood of embarrassment for omitting something momentous. Nevertheless, the
author shall assail such a list:
1. Failure to Comply with Unif. Super. Ct. R. 31.1.
a. No notice filed.
b. Notice untimely (10 days before trial).
c. Court abused discretion by shortening notice under the facts of the particular case
(State why an abuse in this case.).
2. Failure to Comply with Unif. Super. Ct. R. 31.3.
a. Notice not in writing.
b. Notice not served on defendant's counsel or not served timely.
c. Notice not sufficient.
1. Does not state with sufficient particularity or omits any of the following: the
transaction, date, county, names of victim(s) for each transaction. Unif. Super. Ct. R. 31.3
(B); but see Bohanon v. State, 208 Ga. App. 576, 431 S.E.2d 149 (1993).
2. Omission of copies of accusations or indictment, guilty pleas, or verdicts. Unif.
Super. Ct. R. 31.3 (B); but see Sweatman v. State, 181 Ga. App. 474, 352 S.E.2d 796 (1987).
3. Hearing.
a. Failure to hold hearing. Not waived by failure to object. Riddle v. State, 208 Ga.
App. 8, 10, 430 S.E.2d 153, 154 (1993).
b. Abuse of discretion in failure to hold hearing early enough to prepare.
c. Failure of the state to state a purpose to enable the court to make a balancing
decision. Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640, 409 S.E.2d 649 (1991) (however this case can be
waived by failure to object. See Cole, supra.).
d. Stated purpose is not a permissible one.
e. Failure of the state to offer evidence, but rather stating in its place. (Though cases
have upheld this practice, see Harris v. State, 210 Ga. App. 366, 368(2), 436 S.E.2d 231,
233 (1993)).
f. Transaction is too remote. See Gilstrap v. State, 261 Ga. 798, 799, 410 S.E.2d 423,
424 (1991).
g. The transaction is outside the statute of limitations, uncharged and unadjudicated.
(So far, no authority, but see Moore v. State, 207 Ga. App. 412, 416, 427 S.E.2d 779, 783
(1993) and Gilstrap v. State, 261 Ga. 798, 798-99, 410 S.E.2d 423, 424 (1991) for possibly
useful dicta.)
h. The defendant was acquitted of the transaction. But see Dowling v. United States,
493 U.S. 342 (1990).
i. Undue prejudice outweighs probative value. Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640, 409
S.E.2d 649 (1991). In this connection, remember the acknowledged higher standard of
similarity for admissibility in a case where the purpose is to prove identity. White v. State,
203 Ga. App. 889, 418 S.E.2d 149 (1992); Smith v. State, 206 Ga. App. 557, 426 S.E.2d 23
(1992).
4. Trial.
a. Proof at trial does not conform to notice or D.A. offer of proof. (If objection fails,
show why a continuance or mistrial is necessary for preparation.) But see Dacus v. State,
213 Ga. App. 180, 444 S.E.2d 110 (1994), where a date error in the notice did not, per se,
prevent admissibility.
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In Davis v. State,"' the court of appeals found that it was not
necessary for the admissibility of evidence of a similar transaction for
the state to show that a plea of guilty to the similar transaction was
freely and voluntarily entered." 1 The court of appeals declined to
extend the rule for evidence in aggravation of punishment for sentencing 2 to similar transactions.5

In Hilliardv. State, the defense objected to the state's evidence of
similar transactions on the theory that the state's evidence was "so
strong without it."' 5 The court of appeals said there was no authority
b. Insufficient or no proof that the defendant is the same person who committed the
similar transaction. Adams v. State, 208 Ga. App. 29, 430 S.E.2d 435 (1993).
c. Insufficient evidence of similarity at trial, such as an attempt to prove the other
transaction with conviction alone, which does not adequately show the facts of the other
transaction. Stephens v. State, 261 Ga. 467, 405 S.E.2d 483 (1991); but see Rindone v.
State, 210 Ga. App. 639, 437 S.E.2d 338 (1993) (D.U.I. and Habitual Violator); Braddy v.
State, 205 Ga. App. 424, 422 S.E.2d 260 (1992); Bookout v. State, 205 Ga. App. 530, 423
S.E.2d 7 (1992); Adams v. State, 208 Ga. App. 29,430 S.E.2d 35 (1993) (sexual molestation
of children); and Parrott v. State, 206 Ga. App. 829, 427 S.E.2d 276 (1992) (conspiracy
indictment for exceptions to the rule in Stephens).
d. The proof of similar transactions includes additional prejudicial transactions which
are not similar or connected or in notice. Sessions v. State, 207 Ga. App. 609, 428 S.E.2d
652 (1993).
e. Witnesses to prove the similar transaction are not on the witness list and not
otherwise shown in the notice.
f. Proof of the similar transactions preceded evidence of the case on trial and could
cause confusion. Gilstrap v. State, 261 Ga. 798, 410 S.E.2d 423 (1991).
g. The judge failed to give or gave inadequate limiting instructions, Stephan v. State,
205 Ga. App. 241,244,422 S.E.2d 25,27(1992). But see Morris v. State, 212 Ga. App. 779,
780, 442 S.E.2d 792, 794 (1994). (The courts seem to be backing away from strictly
limiting the evidence to a specific articulable purpose in favor of the usual "smorgasbord
of possibilities," i.e., identity, knowledge, intent, bent of mind, course of conduct, etc.).
530. 209 Ga. App. 572, 434 S.E.2d 132 (1993).
531. Id. at 573, 434 S.E.2d at 133.
532. Pope v. State, 256 Ga. 195, 345 S.E.2d 831 (1986); Gadson v. State, 198 Ga. App.
315, 398 S.E.2d 409 (1990).
533. Davis v. State, 209 Ga. App. 572, 434 S.E.2d 132 (1993).
534. 211 Ga. App. 842, 440 S.E.2d 729 (1994).
535. Id. at 843, 440 S.E.2d at 730. This same theory might cause a judge to hesitate
and decide to reserve a ruling on admissibility until the defense materializes so that a
better balancing decision could be made. There are three things wrong with such a
procedure: (1) It improperly denies the state the opportunity to prove or disprove a
material point using more than one source of evidence, Floyd v. State, 233 Ga. 280, 283,
210 S.E.2d 810, 813 (1974); Redd v. State, 141 Ga. App. 888, 890, 234 S.E.2d 812, 815
(1977); (2) The defense may rest, thereby denying the state the opportunity to offer
relevant evidence in rebuttal; and (3) Most importantly, the defense may rest and claim
on appeal or habeas that it was chilled in putting on its defense or denied due process by
the threat that the court might admit the evidence in the event the defendant offered
evidence. The probable result of such a claim is anybody's guess.
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for such an objection and found such a practice of gauging admissibility
by need neither "sensible or desirable."5 6
Mistrial. "Once [a jury is] impanelled and sworn, jeopardy attaches],
and [a defendant is] entitled to be acquitted or convicted by that jury
.... If a mistrial is declared without a defendant's consent or over his
objection, the defendant may be retried only if there was a 'manifest
necessity,' for the mistrial."s T
Where the state moves for a mistrial without defendant's consent
because of some activity of the defendant or defense counsel, the judge
should call a recess, count to ten (or maybe 100), take a deep breath, and
think long and hard about it. The judge should then document the fact
that he or she thought long and hard, considering several alternatives
such as precautionary instructions, a continuance, or other alternatives.
Why? Because in several cases this year, one of them a murder case,
retrial was barred after a mistrial was granted hastily on state's motion.
In Smith v. State,538 the court erroneously concluded that defendant
was improperly offering evidence that his custodial statement was
coerced after the statement was admitted without objection.539 Such
evidence was relevant and admissible;"' therefore, the mistrial was
error and retrial was barred. 541
In Dotson v. State,"42 the defense, by continually offering evidence
which had been ruled out, goaded the state into moving for a mistrial,
and the judge hastily granted it. 543 In Bradfield v. State,"44 the court
granted a similar hasty mistrial.' 4 In neither case did the court give
the defense the opportunity to object or suggest alternatives. The record
did not reflect that the court considered alternatives. The court of
appeals in both cases concluded that manifest necessity had not been
shown, and therefore a retrial was barred. 46

536.
537.
538.

211 Ga. App. at 843, 440 S.E.2d at 730.
Smith v. State, 263 Ga. 782, 783, 439 S.E.2d 483, 485 (1994).
Id.

539. Id. at 782, 439 S.E.2d at 484.
540. Id. at 784, 439 S.E.2d at 486. The court also noted that"... the trial court should
give careful, deliberate, and studious consideration to whether the circumstances demand
a mistrial, with a keen eye toward other, less drastic, alternatives, calling for a recess if
necessary and feasible to guard against hasty mistakes." Id. at 783, 439 S.E.2d at 485.
541. Id. at 785, 439 S.E.2d at 486.
542. 213 Ga. App. 7, 443 S.E.2d 650 (1994).
543. Id. at 8, 443 S.E.2d at 652.
544.

211 Ga. App. 318, 439 S.E.2d 100 (1993).

545. Id. at 319, 439 S.E.2d at 102.
546. Dotson, 213 Ga. App. 7, 10-11,443 S.E.2d 650,653-54 (1994); Bradfeld, 211 Ga.
App. 318, 320, 439 S.E.2d 100, 102 (1993).
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The trial court in Venson v. State" 7 was a model for all judges of
how to consider a state's motion for mistrial. The facts in Venson were
somewhat similar to those in Dotson. The court of appeals noted that
the trial judge took a recess, heard extensive argument from defense
counsel, and was "reluctant" to grant the mistrial, although grant it she
did."48 The court of appeals held, "A trial judge has acted within his
sound discretion in rejecting possible alternatives and in granting a
mistrial, if reasonable judges could differ about the proper disposition
....
This great deference means that the availability of another
alternative does not without more render a mistrial order an abuse of
sound discretion.' 4B It thus appears to be more important that a
judge be careful and consider all options than it is for the judge to be
completely correct in the judge's choice of options."'
Closing Remarks. In the past, it has been permissible for counsel to
argue and make analogies to "highly-publicized cases" in closing remarks
in order to illustrate a point.5"' The practice has been upheld as
recently as this year in Curtis v. State."
However, in Bell v.
State,5 3 the supreme court seems to have drawn the line on this
practice by reversing a trafficking in heroin case in which the state had,
in argument, referred to some highly publicized drug-related murder
cases.55' The basis for the reversal was the "longstanding prohibition
against 'the injection into the argument of extrinsic and prejudicial
matters which have no basis in the evidence. ' " 5
Where there are multiple defendants with separate counsel and none
offer evidence in addition to the defendants themselves, counsel for each
defendant is entitled to make both opening and concluding argu-

547. 212 Ga. App. 540, 441 S.E.2d 893 (1994).
548. Id. at 541-42, 441 S.E,2d at 894.
549. Id. at 542, 441 S.E.2d at 895.
550. Id. at 541, 441 S.E.2d at 894. The court also noted that "[tihe manifest necessity
for a mistrial can exist alongside less drastic alternatives, so long as the record discloses

that the trial court considered alternatives before declaring mistrial." Id.
551. Carroll v. State, 143 Ga. App. 230, 237 S.E.2d 703 (1977).
552. 212 Ga. App. 237, 240,441 S.E.2d 776,780 (1994) (citing Cooper v. State, 260 Ga.
549, 550, 397 S.E.2d 705, 706 (1990)).

553. 263 Ga. 776, 776-77, 439 S.E.2d 480, 480 (1984).
554. Id.
555. Id. at 777,439 S.E.2d at 481 (citing Conner v. State, 251 Ga. 113, 303 S.E.2d 266
(1983)). All the justices concurred except Hunt, who dissented. It is not clear whether this
is a per se prohibition or a fact specific case. A prosecutor would do well to use discretion.
Does this mean that defense counsel in a death penalty case will not be permitted to argue
well-publicized instances where innocent people have been wrongly convicted?
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ments5 ' under O.C.G.A. section 17-8-71. 557 Thus, it was error for
the trial court, under these facts, to require one counsel to open and the
other to conclude the closing argument. In Givens v. State,5 8 the court
of appeals found the error harmless.5 9
Charge of the Court. The pattern jury instructions' can certainly
be convenient. Counsel, though, should avoid the increasingly common
practice of requesting charges by reference to the pattern jury instruction using page and number or even by submitting a copy of the pattern
instruction. While such a practice seems logical, easy, and harmless, it
can be dangerous for one's client. In James v. State, 61 an armed
robbery case, defendant requested a lesser included offense charge on
theft by taking from the "pattern jury instructions," more particularly,
"Part 4G1 et. seq. (specifically 4G5(b)-value less than $500.00)." 2
The request was ambiguous and overly broad in that it included an
instruction defining financial institutions, a totally inapplicable charge.
"If any portion of a requested charge is inapt, incorrect, misleading,
confusing, not adequately adjusted or tailored, or not reasonably raised
... by the evidence, denial of the charge request is proper."'
The
court of appeals ruled that there was no proper request to charge;
therefore, it was not error for the court to refuse to give the lesser
offense in charge.'
If requests to charge are submitted after the commencement of trial,
it may be too late. In Walker v. State,"'5 defendant requested an easily
anticipated charge on circumstancial evidence on the final day of

556. Givens v. State, 211 Ga. App. 290, 292, 439 S.E.2d 22, 24 (1993), rev'd on other
grounds, 264 Ga. 522, 448 S.E.2d 687 (1994).
557. O.C.G.A. § 17-8-71 (1990) provides: "After the evidence is closed on both sides, the
prosecuting attorney shall open and conclude the argument to the jury. If the defendant
introduces no evidence, his counsel shall open and conclude the argument to the jury after
the evidence on the part of the state is closed." Id.
558. 211 Ga. App. 290, 439 S.E.2d 22 (1993).
559. Id. at 293, 439 S.E.2d at 25; but see Givens v. State, 264 Ga. 522, 448 S.E.2d 687
(1994) (reversing the court of appeals) which held that the error was reversible, not
harmless. Id.
560. COUNCIL OF SUPERIOR COURT JUDGES OF GEORGIA, SUGGESTED PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS, VOL. II, CRIMINAL CASES (1991).

561. 210 Ga. App. 454, 436 S.E.2d 565 (1993).
562. Id. at 454, 436 S.E.2d at 566.
563. Id., 436 S.E.2d at 567 (quoting Harris v. State, 202 Ga. App. 618,621,414 S.E.2d
919, 922 (1992)).
564. Id.
565. 213 Ga. App. 407, 444 S.E.2d 824 (1994).
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5 67
trial.566 This was a violation of Uniform Superior Court Rule 10.3;
therefore, it was not error for the trial judge to refuse to give the charge.
The court in Metts v. State' held that where the defense of accident
is the only defense and there is evidence to support such a charge, it is
error for the court to fail to give it in charge even without request.56
Charge of the Court: CircumstantialEvidence. In Mims v. State,5 0
the supreme court finally put an end to the arguing and construing
regarding its opinion in Robinson v. State.57' A number of cases had
seized on the word "depends" in Robinson and other interpretations to
avoid reversals where trial judges had not charged on "circumstancial
evidence." It is as if the court of appeals did not believe the supreme
court meant what it said in Robinson about the necessity of the "magic"
charge on circumstancial evidence.'
The supreme court eliminated
the word "depends" and held that the charge on circumstantial
evidence 73 must be given on request in any case in which there is any
circumstantial evidence. 74 The best thing to come out of this case is
Justice Hunt's concurrence."' What if, on a trial of two codefendants
where there is direct and circumstantial evidence, one defendant
requests a charge on circumstantial evidence, but the other defendant
objects because the charge required under Robinson and Mims conveys
to the jury that they may convict on a lesser standard of proof on direct

566. Id. at 413, 444 S.E.2d at 830.
567. GA. RULES OF COURT ANNOTATED, Unif. Super. Ct. R. 10.3 (1994) provides:

All requests to charge shall be numbered consecutively on separate sheets of
paper and submitted to the court in duplicate by counsel for all parties at the
commencement of trial, unless otherwise provided by pre-trial order; provided,
however, that additional requests may be submitted to cover unanticipated points
which arise thereafter.
Id.
568. 210 Ga. App. 197, 435 S.E.2d 525 (1993).
569. Id. at 198, 435 S.E.2d at 526.
570. 264 Ga. 271, 271, 443 S.E.2d 845, 846 (1994).
571. 261 Ga. 698, 410 S.E.2d 116 (1991) (which required that the charge on
circumstantial evidence be given on every case which depends in whole or in part on
circumstantial evidence, whether or not any direct evidence has been impeached). Id.
572. See Mims, 209 Ga. App. 901, 434 S.E.2d 832 (1993); Johnson v. State, 209 Ga.
App. 632, 434 S.E.2d 169 (1993); Chandler v. State, 204 Ga. App. 512, 419 S.E.2d 751
(1992); Rash v. State, 207 Ga. App. 585, 428 S.E.2d 799 (1993).
573. O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (1982) provides: "To warrant a conviction on circumstantial
evidence, the proved facts shall not only be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but
shall exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused."
574. 264 Ga. at 272, 443 S.E.2d at 846-47.
575. Id. at 273 (Hunt, J., concurring) (joined by Fletcher and Sears-Collins, JJ).
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evidence?57 This was noted in Justice Hunt's concurrence, and he
suggested a solution.
Because [the usual circumstantial evidence charge coinciding with
O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6] implies, erroneously, that direct evidence requires
a lesser standard of proof, that is, that direct evidence would not have
to exclude every other reasonable theory, I would substitute the
following:
You would be authorized to convict only if the evidence proves the
guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt and the evidence
excludes all reasonable theories of innocence. It is the state's burden
to produce such evidence. 7
Additional cases have held that the "two theories" charge should never
be given.57 More importantly, a defense counsel should not put all his
eggs in one basket by requesting only the "two equal theories" circumstantial evidence charge. This charge does not even qualify for the
record as a request to charge circumstantial evidence so as to invoke the
requirement of Mims that the charge be given."'
Verdicts. The inconsistent verdict rule was abolished in Milam v.
State.'0 Therefore, the results of Cleveland v. State5 ' are not terribly surprising. In Cleveland defendant was charged with aggravated
assault and possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony,"'

576. This will happen. See McGuire v. State, 209 Ga. App. 813, 816, 434 S.E.2d 802,
804 (1993) (Beasley, J., concurring) (citing Davis v. State, 74 Ga. 869, 880 (1885)), in which
she notes circumstantial evidence "requires a higher quantum and quality to support a
conviction." Id.
577. 264 Ga. at 274, 443 S.E.2d at 848 (Hunt, J., concurring). Note no reference to the
terms direct or circumstantial evidence, thus the emphasis is shifted to sufficiency of the
evidence as it should be.
578. Cantrell v. State, 212 Ga. App. 288,441 S.E.2d 879 (1994); Johnson v. State, 210
Ga. App. 99, 435 S.E.2d 458 (1993). See also Langston v. State, 208 Ga. App. 175, 430
S.E.2d 365 (1993).
579. Kelly v. State, 212 Ga. App. 278, 442 S.E.2d 462 (1994) (a full court opinion).
580. 255 Ga. 560, 562, 341 S.E.2d 216, 218 (1986).
581. 212 Ga. App. 361, 441 S.E.2d 820 (1994).
582. Id. See also O.C.G.A. § 16-11-106(b) (1992) which provides:
Any person who shall have on or within arm's reach of his person a firearm or
a knife having a blade of three or more inches in length during the commission of,
or the attempt to commit:
(1) Any crime against or involving the person of another;
(2) The unlawful entry into a building or vehicle;
(3) A theft from a building or theft of a vehicle;
(4) Any crime involving the possession, manufacture, delivery, distribution,
dispensing, administering, selling, or possession with intent to distribute any
controlled substance as provided in Code Section 16-13-30; or
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the felony being the aggravated assault. The jury inexplicably found
defendant not guilty of the aggravated assault, but guilty of possession
of a firearm during the commission of the very same aggravated
8 3 The court of appeals could not reconcile the verdicts, but,
assault."
because there is no inconsistent verdict rule, it affirmed the lower
court.'84

Compare Harrison v. State' in which the defendant was charged
with possession of a firearm during commission of a felony armed
robbery. The jury convicted the defendant of the firearm charge, but
instead of armed robbery, the jury found the defendant guilty of the
The court of appeals
lesser included offense of theft by taking.'
never discussed the inconsistent verdict rule but merely found that it
must reverse on the basis of Jefferson v. State58 7 because the jury had
determined there was no felony, only a misdemeanor. 88
May a jury return a verdict for a lesser included offense even though
the lesser offense was not defined nor charged to the jury as one of their
options? That is what the jury did in Freeman v.State, 9 a murder
case, when they returned a verdict of involuntary manslaughter absent
a formal charge on that offense. The trial judge would not accept the
verdict, but sent the jury back to deliberate further. The jury then
returned a verdict for voluntary manslaughter, an option authorized by
the jury charge.590 The court of appeals reversed; relying on some
ancient authority 9 1 and finding that the verdict of guilty of involun-

(5) Any crime involving the trafficking of cocaine, marijuana, or illegal drugs
as provided in Code Section 16-13-31, and which crime is a felony, commits a
felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by confinement for a period
of five years, such sentence to run consecutively to any other sentence which the
person has received.

Id.
583.

212 Ga. App. at 361, 441 S.E.2d at 820.

584. Id.
585.

213 Ga. App. 366, 444 S.E.2d 613 (1994).

586. Id. at 367, 444 S.E.2d at 613.
587.

196 Ga. App. 770, 397 S.E.2d 129 (1990). Jefferson is merely a case that deals

with jury charges on when a jury would be authorized to find the defendant guilty of
possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. It does not deal with a verdict
such as in Harrison,supra.
588. 213 Ga. App. at 368, 444 S.E.2d at 615. Ironically, if the jury had acquitted the
defendant of armed robbery in similar fashion to the jury in Cleveland, 212 Ga. App. 361,
441 S.E.2d 820 (1994), the firearm conviction in Harrison would have been upheld as in
Cleveland, supra. See also Camsler,supra notes 101-05, dealing with armed robbery and
theft by receiving of the same property.

589. 210 Ga. App. 183,435 S.E.2d 461(1993), rev'd, 264 Ga. 276,444 S.E.2d 80(1994).
590. 210 Ga. App. at 183-84, 435 S.E.2d at 462.

591. Register v. State, 10 Ga. App. 623, 74 S.E.2d 429 (1911).
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tary manslaughter was an acquittal of voluntary manslaughter. 92 The
court of appeals found the trial judge was not authorized to reject the
involuntary manslaughter verdict and remanded to the trial court with
direction."9 ' Fortunately, the supreme court reversed the court of
appeals and overruled the ancient authority.59 ' The supreme court
further established a correct procedure for receiving verdicts: The trial
judge and counsel should review the verdict before it is published to see
that it is appropriate; if not, send it back with direction for further
deliberation.9 '
Sentencing: ProbationConditions. It was not error for the trial judge
9 6 to require a person
in Ballenger v. State"
convicted of driving under
the influence of alcohol and habitual violator to wear a florescent
bracelet, identifying him as a "D.U.I. CONVICT" as a condition of
probation.59 7 Conditions of probation need not be expressly authorized
by statute. 95 Furthermore, it did not violate equal protection nor
constitute cruel and unusual punishment. The court noted that the two
purposes of probation are rehabilitation of the offender and protection
of society. The court could not find that the bracelet condition of
probation was not reasonably related to both of those purposes.'
In order to invoke the mandatory life sentence provisions of O.C.G.A.
section 16-13-30(d)w° for a recidivist sale of cocaine, does the state
have to notify the defense of intent to use prior drug convictions for that

592. Freeman, 210 Ga. App. at 184, 435 S.E.2d at 462.
593. Id.
594. State v. Freeman, 264 Ga. 276,278,444 S.E.2d 80,82 (1994). The court noted "[iut
is the province of the court to construe the law applicable in the trial of a criminal case,
and of the jury to apply the law so construed to the facts in evidence. While the
impanelled jurors are made absolutely and exclusively judges of the facts in the case, they
are, in this sense only, judges of the law." (quoting Berry v. State, 105 Ga. 683, 31 S.E.
592 (1898)). Id.
595. Id.
596. 210 Ga. App. 627, 436 S.E.2d 793 (1993).
597. Id.
598. Id. at 628, 436 S.E.2d at 794. The court noted other unusual conditions of
probation that had been approved, particularly Boy Scout requirements in Mangiapane v.
State, 178 Ga. App. 836, 344 S.E.2d 756 (1986).
599. 210 Ga. App. at 629, 436 S.E.2d at 794.
600. O.C.GA. § 16-13-30(d) (1992) provides:
Except as otherwise provided, any person who violates subsection (b) of this
Code section with respect to a controlled substance in Schedule I or a narcotic
drug in Schedule II shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall
be punished by imprisonment for not less than five years nor more than 30 years.
Upon conviction of a second or subsequent offense, he shall be imprisoned for life.

19941
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purpose?"l The court of appeals said no in Armstrong v. State.6'
However, the supreme court said yes and reversed the court of appeals.' °3 Furthermore, notice of evidence of similar transactions does
not satisfy the notice requirements invoking the recidivist provision."e4
As previously noted,"e life without parole as an alternative to the
death penalty, passed by the general assembly in 1993,06 was upheld
0 7 Whether or not one agrees with Freeman, it
in Freeman v. State."
will likely soon become a moot point. On November 8, 1994, the people
of Georgia voted approval of a state constitutional amendment' which
will authorize the general assembly to create mandatory minimum
sentences for certain offenses," 9 life without parole for additional
offenses and repeat offenses,6 10 and ratify the previous life-withoutparole statute.1 1
Post-trial. In Rhyne v. State,6 12 after a hung jury on the trial of the
first indictment, the state re-indicted the defendant adding additional
counts, 1 ' ("upping the ante"). The court of appeals reversed the
14
convictions on the new counts because O.C.G.A. section 16-1-7(b

601. Such notice is required for sentencing under the general recidivist statute,
O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7(a) (1990) which provides for maximum punishment in the courts
discretion. See Mitchell v. State, 202 Ga. App. 100, 413 S.E.2d 517 (1991) and O.C.G.A.
§ 17-10-2(b) (1990).
602, 209 Ga. App. 796,434 S.E.2d 560 (1993), affd, 264 Ga. 237,442 S.E.2d 759 (1994).
603. Armstrong v. State, 264 Ga. 237, 238, 442 S.E.2d 759, 760 (1994).
604. Id.
605. See supra notes 11-22 and accompanying text.
606. 1993 Ga. Laws 1654 § 3; O.C.G.A. § 17-10-16 (Supp. 1994).
607. 264 Ga. 27, 28, 440 S.Eo2d 181, 183 (1994).
608. 1994 Ga. Laws 2015.
609. Id. at 2016, Article IV, Section II, Paragraph II, subparagraph (b)(2) authorizing
the general assembly to enact mandatory minimum and no parole sentence for armed
robbery, kidnapping, rape, aggravated child molestation, aggravated sodomy, and
aggravated sexual battery. Id.
610. Id. Article IV, Section II, Paragraph II, Subparagraph (b)(3) authorizing the
general assembly to enact statutes requiring life without parole for murder and for armed
robbery, kidnapping, rape, aggravated child molestation, aggravated sodomy, or aggravated
sexual battery if previously convicted of one of those offenses, the so-called "two strikes and
you're out" provision. Id.
611. Id. Article IV, Section II, Paragraph II, Subparagraph (b)(4), which ratifies
O.C.G.A. § 17-10-16. Id.
612. 209 Ga. App. 548, 434 S.E.2d 76 (1993).
613. Id. at 552, 434 S.E.2d at 80.
614. O.C.G.A. § 16-1-7(b) provides:
If the several crimes arising from the same conduct are known to the proper
prosecuting officer at the time of commencing the prosecution and are within the
jurisdiction of a single court, they must be prosecuted in a single prosecution
except as provided in subsection (c) of this Code section.
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prohibits multiple,- prosecutions for crimes arising out of the same
conduct. 15 The court further held that the defendant "is not to be
penalized, by the addition of new charges, for the state's failure to obtain
a conviction upon the first trial.""
Is there such a thing as a motion for directed verdict of acquittal
notwithstanding a mistrial? Also in Rhyne, after the same mistrial due
to hung jury, the defense moved for judgment of acquittal notwithstanding a mistrial." 7 The state nolle prossed without defendant's consent
before the court ruled on the defense motion.1 A nolle pros without
defendant's consent after a case has been submitted to a jury will result
in an acquittal on a plea of former jeopardy.61 But if there is a
mistrial, then the status goes back to the way it was before trial, that is,
the case can be nolle prossed without defendant's consent.6 2 Therefore, a retrial was not barred. The court also held there is no such
procedure in Georgia -as a motion for judgment notwithstanding
mistrial.6 21 Any previous authority seemingly to the contrary was
exposed as mere dicta and was disapproved.622
Pleas of Guilty ReservingAppeal. In 1991, the court of appeals began
an experiment allowing parties to enter pleas of guilty reserving the
right to appeal certain issues on the express approval of the trial
judge.62 There were many problems, much confusion, and considerable litigation with this new procedure.624 One such problem was seen
in Veal v. State,625 in which the defendant entered a plea of guilty and
reserved the right to appeal the trial court's denial of a motion to
suppress.6 26 Unfortunately, the defense filed a motion for new trial.
Within 30 days after the denial of the motion for new trial, but more
than 30 days after the plea, the defendant filed an appeal.6 27 The

Id.
615. 209 Ga. App. at 552, 443 S.E.2d at 80.
616. Id. (quoting Curry v. State, 248 Ga. 183, 184, 281 S.E.2d 604, 606 (1981)).
617. Id. at 549, 434 S.E.2d at 77-78.
618. Id. at 550, 434 S.E.2d at 78.
619. Id. (citing Jones v. State, 55 Ga. 625 (1876)).
620. 209 Ga. App. at 550, 434 S.E.2d at 78.
621. Id., 434 S.E.2d at 79.
622. Id. at 551, 434 S.E.2d at 79 (disapproving King v. State, 246 Ga. 386, 271 S.E.2d
630 (1980); Glass v. State, 250 Ga. 736, 300 S.E.2d 812 (1983)).
623. Mims v. State, 201 Ga. App. 277, 279, 410 S.E.2d 824, 825 (1991).
624. See Chambers v. State, 210 Ga. App. 71, 435 S.E.2d 291 (1993); Parker v. State,
211 Ga. App. 187,438 S.E.2d 664 (1993); Woody v. State, 212 Ga. App. 186,441 S.E.2d 505
(1994).
625. 211 Ga. App. 815, 440 S.E.2d 714 (1994).
626. Id. at 815, 440 S.E.2d at 714.
627. Id.
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court of appeals dismissed the appeal because "[a] motion for a new trial
is not the proper vehicle for contesting a guilty plea; rather it may be
challenged for the first time on appeal.'
Therefore, the motion for
new trial did not extend the time for appeal. The appeal was therefore
untimely. 29
The court of appeals spent more time and print litigating and
clarifying the procedural issues in a plea reserving appeal than it did
actually resolving the issues to be appealed.3 The court of appeals
literally threw up its hands, abandoned the Mims experiment, and
abolished the "plea reserving appeal" in Hooten v. State." 1
Another appeal which was lost due to confusion over extensions of
time was Hughes v. State. 2 In Hughes the trial judge granted two
extensions of time to file the notice of appeal. The defendant actually
filed his notice of appeal within the second extension but over twentyeight days after expiration of the first extension.3
Unfortunately,
O.C.G.A. section 5-6-39(a)' only allows one extension and that for no
more than the original time for filing an appeal. The appeal was
untimely and, therefore, dismissed. 5
Revocation. In Perry v. State," a defendant's probated sentence was
partially revoked due to a violation. Thereafter, the balance of his

628. Id.
629. Id.
630. 211 Ga. App. 815, 440 S.E.2d 714 (1994). See supra note 609.
631. Hooten v. State, 212 Ga. App. 770, 775, 442 S.E.2d 836, 840 (1994). This holding
is effective 30 days after the date the decision in Hooten is first published in the advance
sheets; the effective date is therefore July 9, 1994. Georgia Advance Sheets, Vol. 10, No.
47 (June 9, 1994). However, counsel may still try stipulating the evidence and a verdict
in order to avoid a wasteful trial, but preserve an appeal.
632. 210 Ga. App. 833, 437 S.E.2d 841 (1993).
633. Id.
634. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-39(a) (1982) provides:
Any judge of the trial court or any justice or judge of the appellate court to
which the appeal is to be taken may, in his discretion, and without motion or
notice to the other party, grant extensions of time for the filing of:
(1) Notice of appeal;
(2) Notice of cross appeal;
(3) Transcript of the evidence and proceedings on appeal or in any other
instance where filing of the transcript is required or permitted by law;
(4) Designation of record referred to under Code Section 5-6-42; and
(5) Any other similar motion, proceeding, or paper for which a filing time is
prescribed.
Id.
635. 210 Ga. App. at 833, 437 S.E.2d at 841.
636. 213 Ga. App. 220, 444 S.E.2d 150 (1994).
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sentence was revoked based on additional violations. 7 It would make
no difference if the prosecutor knew about the subsequent violations at
the time of the first hearing. A proceeding to revoke probation is not a
criminal proceeding, and "there is no double jeopardy protection against
revocation of probation and the imposition of imprisonment.'

637. I& at 220, 444 S.E.2d at 151.
638. Id. at 221, 444 S.E.2d at 151.

